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The end of the Cold War generated military budget constraints and downsizing
that resulted in the active force having to rely on Reserve component support. Enlisted
losses in the USAR, however, have been increasing. For FY 97, approximately 23% of
enlisted losses were due to unsatisfactory participation. These losses equate to lost
training dollars and decreased force readiness. The objectives of this thesis are to identify
the factors that lead to unsatisfactory participation within U.S. Army Reserve units, and
recommend changes which should lead to increased participation and force readiness.
This study has used a methodology that involved talking to reservists, who left their units,
to discuss the reasons and timing of their decisions to depart. An integrated model has
been developed as a framework to study the Reserve organizational socialization process.
Many identified unmet expectations in training and leadership areas, and many exited
because they were unable to resolve these dissatisfactions. Unit leadership exacerbated
these problems through little or ineffective attempts to rectify the reservists' problems, as
well as inadequate efforts to influence the reservist to return to the unit.
Recommendations include: providing new reservists realistic job previews; emphasizing
the importance of the first training weekend and the sponsorship program in leadership
training; expanding the unit retention sergeant's duties to cover the entire scope of the
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The end of the Cold War generated military budget constraints and downsizing
that resulted in the active force having to increasingly rely on Reserve component
support. Soon after, the Gulf War required the largest Reserve activation and
mobilization since WWII. These events marked the beginning of a change in the mission
for the Army Reserve, and its integration into the Department of Defense's (DOD's)
Total Force Policy. The primary objectives of the Total Force Policy are to maintain a
small, active, peacetime force able to meet the National Military Strategy, and to integrate
the capabilities of active and reserve forces into a more cost-effective fighting force. To
meet these objectives, more combat support and combat service support capabilities have
been transferred to the Reserve. Approximately 40% of the Army's support forces are
currently in the Reserve ("History of the Army Reserve," 1997, 6). As evidence of their
new role, the Army Times recently reported that reservists have been called three times in
the last five years to reduce the burden on the active Army. Presently, approximately
10,000 reservists are serving in Bosnia (Ledford, 1997, 26). With the increased reliance
on the Army Reserve, unit readiness and deployability has become a vital concern to
Army leadership. Historically, in order to be deployed, a combat unit had to meet or
exceed a personnel readiness rating of 85%, and support forces had to meet or exceed a
personnel readiness rating of 65% (Sorter et al., 1995, 32). A 1995 Rand Report
identified that the average Reserve unit activated for the Gulf War had a personnel
readiness rate of only 63%. The shortfall was due to unfilled positions (1 1%), and
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positions filled with soldiers waiting to complete training to be duty qualified (26%)
(Orvis et al., 1995, xii). These shortfalls can be directly attributed to a high personnel
turnover rate in the Reserves. Many of these losses can be linked to nonparticipation,
which occurs when reservists decide to stop attending unit training sessions (drills). A
reduction in personnel turnover would ultimately result in budget savings, as well as an
overall increase in total force readiness.
To address the issue of nonparticipation, an integrated conceptual model has been
developed from Jablin's stages of socialization and the theory of psychological contracts.
In general, this model contains the stages of anticipatory socialization, encounter,
metamorphosis, and assimilation. The model provides a framework to examine the
organizational socialization process as it applies to the context of the Army Reserve, and
guides the study of the reasons a reservist exits the unit.
B. OBJECTIVES OF THE RESEARCH
The two main objectives of this thesis are as follows:
1
.
Identify and analyze the factors leading to unsatisfactory participation within
U.S. Army Reserve units.
2. Recommend changes which should lead to increased participation and force
readiness.
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS
The primary research question is: What factors influence members to stop
participating in Reserve unit drills? The subsidiary research questions, organized to




What are the sources of information about the Army Reserve program, and are
they accurate?
2. What are the sources of information about the Reserve unit, and are they
accurate?




How well does the unit begin to integrate the reservist in the encounter stage?
2. What is the nature of met and unmet expectations during the encounter stage,
and do unmet expectations relate to the reasons for exiting during this stage?
3. What attempts did reservists who left during the encounter stage make to
remedy dissatisfaction, and what did actions did leadership take to resolve problems?
Metamorphosis
1 What is the nature of met and unmet expectations during the metamorphosis
stage, and do unmet expectations relate to the reasons for exiting during this stage?
2. What attempts did reservists who left during the metamorphosis stage make to
remedy dissatisfaction, and what actions did leadership take to resolve problems?
Exit
1 After a reservist exited the unit, did anyone personally contact him?
2. What would influence a reservist to rejoin a Reserve unit, and is it related to
the reason he exited?
3. What recommendations do nonparticipants have for Army Reserve leadership
to reduce nonparticipation?
D. SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS
This thesis focuses on factors which lead enlisted members of the U.S. Army
Reserve (USAR) to fail to participate in unit drills and training. Failure to attend unit
drills results in reservists' involuntary transfer to the Inactive Ready Reserve (IRR).
Although procedures exist for reservists to voluntarily transfer into the IRR, only enlisted
reservists who were involuntarily transferred were included in this research. The study
was limited to involuntary transfers to determine the reasons prompting reservists to
accept negative consequences, such as loss of rank, as a result of being classified as
unsatisfactory participants.
Additionally, the sampling frame only includes the unsatisfactory participants
recorded in the United States Army Reserve (USAR) database for fiscal year 1997. Also,
the sample was limited to 1 00 respondents, which is relatively small compared to the
population of nonparticipating members.
As with any research method which involves interview protocols, both the
questions and data are subject to the both the skill and interpretation of the researcher.
Furthermore, the respondents in the sample, who have failed to fulfill Reserve contract
obligations, may have attribution biases which place blame for their behavior on the
institution or others rather than on themselves.
E. METHODOLOGY
The first step consisted of a literature review regarding the organization of the
Reserve, their emerging role in national defense, and, finally, budget and personnel issues
impacting readiness. The second step involved reviewing social science research to
determine a theoretical framework for analyzing the specific problem of unsatisfactory
participation. Based on initial examination of the problem of unsatisfactory participation
within the body of related organizational management research, the third step was to
design an interview protocol to capture data to answer the research questions. The
method chosen was a telephonic interview consisting of qualitative, open-end questions
which allowed opportunities to expand or probe responses. A sample of 100 telephonic
interviews of nonparticipating members was taken using the USAR database list, and
then coded for entry into Minitab and Excel for statistical analysis. The final step was to
discuss the results of the statistical data analysis and provide recommendations to
increase member participation in the Reserve.
F. ORGANIZATION OF THESIS
This thesis is divided into five chapters. Chapter I introduces the topic and
outlines the thesis' objectives, scope, limitations and research questions. Chapter II
provides an overview of the Army Reserve, addressing composition of the force, the
USAR's emerging role in the Total Force Policy, newcomer entry and assimilation, and
finally, discusses the problem of personnel turnover due to unsatisfactory participation.
Chapter HI discusses the theoretical framework of the study, and consists of a literature
review of research relevant to the topic of personnel turnover. The discussion includes a
general overview of exchange theory, equity theory, psychological contracts, met
expectation theory, realistic job previews, and the stages of socialization. These theories
formed the framework of the study, and fostered the development of an integrated
conceptual model which will be used to study the problem of nonparticipation in the
Army Reserve. Chapter IV explains the research methodology used to collect and




The mission of the U.S. Army Reserve is to "meet Department of the Army (DA)
contingency operations or mobilization requirements" (AR 140-1 1). As the drawdown
of the Total Force continues and the potential for regional conflicts requiring the short
notice deployment of large numbers of soldiers increases, the Army will have to
increasingly rely on the Reserve to fill/augment force and mission requirement gaps.
Currently, the Reserve is the Army's primary source of combat support (CS) and combat
service support (CSS) assets. According to one Rand Report, the Reserve Component is
expected to constitute 39 percent of the nation's defense force by fiscal year 1999
(Buddin & Kirby, 1996, 2). The issue of Reserve readiness, then, is critical to our
national military strategy, and is of great concern to congressional policymakers.
The first section of Chapter II provides an overview of the composition of the
Reserve, and discusses unit deployment requirements. The discussion includes a brief
description of the readiness/deployment issues the Reserve experienced during Operation
Desert Shield/Storm. The second and third sections discuss the process of integrating a
new reservist into a unit, and identify responsibilities of unit members as well as the
obligations of the new reservist. The remaining section specifically addresses the
problem of unsatisfactory participation, the replacement costs, and the impact on unit
readiness.
B. ROLE OF THE SELECT RESERVE
This section addresses the increased role of the Army Reserve based on the Total
Force Policy, and the composition of the Reserve force. The discussion also includes
readiness requirements for units, and reviews the deployment issues that were identified
during the Reserve mobilization for Operation Desert Shield/Storm.
1. Total Force Policy
The Total Force Policy of 1973 coincided with the end of the draft and the
beginning of the all-volunteer force at the end of the Vietnam War. The policy specified
that the United States maintain an active duty force with the capability of maintaining
peace and deterring aggression. The active force, when necessary, would be reinforced
by a "well-trained and well-equipped" Reserve Component ("History of the Army
Reserve," 1997, 3). This new policy marked a shift of some responsibility for the
National Military Strategy to the Army Reserve.
As the nation became more budget-conscious in the post-Cold War era, the
Reserve provided a cost-effective alternative to maintaining full capability in the active
force. Expanded Reserve roles include responding to regional crises, peacekeeping/peace
enforcement, humanitarian assistance, and disaster relief, demonstrated by Reserve
participation in Operation Desert Shield/Storm, Operation Provide Hope (Somalia), and
their current participation in Operation Joint Endeavor (Bosnia).
The Reserve maintains a significant number of the Army's combat support and
combat service support units. As a result of the transfer of these critical support
capabilities to the Reserve, the Reserve has been integrated into virtually all regional and
theater operational plans ("Reserve Component Programs," 1995, 2). Issues of readiness,
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therefore, not only affect the Reserve Component, but also affect the mission readiness
and capabilities of the total force.
2. Composition
The Reserve component is organized into three manpower/management
categories: the Ready Reserve, the Standby Reserve, and the Retired Reserve. Figure 1 is
a schematic of the composition of the Reserve. This thesis specifically focuses on the
Ready Reserve. A brief overview, to include composition, policies, and procedures


























Figure 1. Structure of the Reserve Component
The Ready Reserve consists of the Select Reserve, the Individual Ready Reserve
(ERR), as well as the Inactive National Guard (ING). Members of the Ready Reserve are
subject to Presidential recall for war or for national emergencies, as prescribed in Title 10
of the United States Code ("Reserve Component Programs," 1995, 3).
Select Reserve members are assigned to operational units, augmentation units,
Individual Mobilization Augmentee (IMA) positions, or Full Time Support (FTS)
positions. Operational units, or Troop Program Units (TPUs), train and deploy with unit
integrity, while augmentation units train as units during peacetime, but are integrated into
active Army units when mobilized. EVlAs train as individuals during peacetime, and
augment active Army units during wartime. Members in FTS positions are drilling
members who serve as cadre for select Reserve units.
3. Personnel Readiness Requirements
Personnel readiness can be simply defined as having the right number of soldiers
with the correct skills (Sorter, et al., 1994, 31). The correct skills, or training requirements
of reservists, play a major role in determining personnel readiness. Initial entry training, a
requirement for all reservists, is comprised of both basic training and advanced individual
training. While basic training teaches all soldiers necessary combat skills, advanced
individual training provides soldiers training in a specific military occupational specialty
(MOS). Successful completion of these two phases of initial entry training results in the
soldier being awarded a MOS, and being classified as MOS qualified. The significance
of reservists who have not completed initial training and are not MOS qualified is that
these reservists cannot be deployed. Approximately 20-30 percent of positions in the
Reserve are filled by members who are not MOS qualified (Buddin & Grissmer, 1 994, 2).
This estimate, combined with the fact that most units have fewer personnel assigned than
they are authorized, results in readiness ratings which may prevent units from deploying
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despite the need for the capabilities of the unit.
The Army uses Army Regulation (AR) 220- 1 , Unit Status Reporting, as one
measure of unit readiness. AR 220-1 outlines policies procedures for units to determine
readiness. Personnel readiness is one of the requirements a unit must meet before being
qualified for deployment. Personnel readiness is determined through the calculation of
available strength and available MOS trained strength. Available strength is defined as
the percentage of required wartime personnel who are medically, physically, and legally
deployable. Available MOS trained strength (DMOSQ - duty MOS qualified) is defined
as the percentage of required wartime personnel who are both available to deploy and
MOS qualified for their assigned duty position (Sorter, et al., 1994, 32). These personnel
readiness measures are used, along with other measures such as equipment-on-hand and
training readiness, to determine a unit's overall readiness rating (C-rating). The unit's C-
rating must meet or exceed the unit's Authorized Level of Organization (ALO), which
designates the readiness level the unit must attain, before being qualified for deployment.
Rectifying the nondeployable personnel status of the unit requires unqualified reservists
to be trained (or retrained) until duty MOS qualified, or qualified reservists from other
units to be transferred into the unit.
The impact of degraded readiness levels of reserve units due to personnel fill
shortages and MOS qualification shortfalls was highlighted during Operation Desert
Shield/Storm. On average, approximately 20% of all activated unit's personnel shortfalls
had to be corrected through crossleveling (Orvis, et al., 1995, xiii). Whereas these
shortfalls may not have been important in the past, the active component's increased
reliance on the Reserve made personnel readiness a critical issue. Although the reservists
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who were transferred into units with shortages fixed the shortfall problem, it created unit
training (collective training) difficulties as these individuals had never trained with the
unit they were scheduled to deploy with ("Operation Desert Storm," 1992, 35).
Personnel readiness shortfalls are driven by high rates of personnel turnover
(Sorter, et al., 1994, 32). The causes of personnel turnover must first be identified, and
then addressed to ensure the Reserve is ready to deploy when called as part of the total
force.
C. RECRUITMENT AND RETENTION OF RESERVISTS
Recruiting starts the joining process for a potential recruit, and retention "is the
cornerstone of personnel readiness" ("Reserve Component Programs," 1995, 41). This
section addresses the processes and policies of recruiting and retaining a new reservist in
order to lay the foundation to examine potential causes of personnel turnover. It also
identifies recruiting agencies, and the specific responsibilities of recruiters and key unit
members to integrate the new reservist into the unit.
1. Recruiting Organizations/Process
Unlike the Active Army, which only accesses soldiers through the United States
Army Recruiting Command (USAREC), the Reserve Component has three organizations
responsible for Reserve accessions. These agencies include USAREC, Department of the
Army Personnel Command (PERSCOM), and the Army Reserve Personnel Command
(ARPERCOM). USAREC, the only organization in which recruiters access active and
reserve soldiers, accounts for the majority of all reserve accessions. PERSCOM's role in
the process is to use in-service recruiters located at transition points to encourage soldiers
leaving the active Army to join the Reserve. ARPERCOM manages the Inactive Ready
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Reserve (IRR) data base and also recruits reservists for the Select Reserve by screening
the IRR database for members eligible to fill unit shortages.
The role of the recruiter, located in offices throughout the country and overseas, is
to be a uniformed representative of the Army and to positively and accurately portray
military life ("Military Recruiting", 1994, 13). Recruiters canvass prospective recruits
through means such as making presentations at local high schools, advertising at
community events, and contacting individuals directly. Additionally, the Army Reserve
is advertising and recruiting through a web site on the Internet which allows interested
individuals to contact recruiters in their geographical area.
After individuals have decided to enlist, the recruiter registers them for processing
at the Military Entrance Processing Station (MEPS). Processing at the MEPS for the
recruits includes taking a standardized test (the Armed Services Vocational Battery
/Armed Forces Qualification Test), which measures a soldier's quality and trainability,
and taking a medical exam ("Military Recruiting," 1994, 12). Finally, the recruits choose,
or are assigned a MOS based on their test scores and medical qualifications. After the
recruit has a MOS, a contract is prepared for either the Delayed Entry Program (DEP), or
immediate reserve or active duty. The DEP primarily allows enlistees to resolve
scheduling complications and allows recruiters to coordinate allocations for initial entry
training (Mitchell, 1994, 22).
Recruiting is a proactive program designed to enlist the most qualified soldiers
into the Reserve and Active Components. Recruiters and other service representatives in
the recruiting process influence an enlistee's first impressions and expectations of the




Retention can be defined as "the sum of leadership actions that create a positive
training environment and influence soldiers to continue serving in the USAR, while
enhancing units' personnel readiness" (USARC 140-6, 1997, 3). An effective retention
program, therefore, is critical to personnel readiness. The retention process begins with
the assignment of new reservists from one of the accessioning agencies, and continues
throughout the career of the soldier. USARC recognizes that reservists' anxieties can be
reduced through the proper integration of a soldier into a unit, and research demonstrates
that first impressions of a unit impact a reservist's decision to continue to participate
(USARC 140-6, 1997,6).
Designated individuals in the unit have responsibilities, outlined in USARC
Regulation 140-6, to ensure a new reservist is properly welcomed and integrated into the
unit. The majority of these responsibilities are included in the sponsorship program. The
sponsorship program requires 100% sponsorship of all new reservists, and these
requirements, discussed later in this chapter, are documented on a sponsorship checklist
(USARC Form 62-R; Sponsor's Guide and Inprocessing Checklist), which must be
completed and placed in unit files. The recruiter has the primary responsibility for the
reservist's transition from the recruiting station to the unit. The recruiter is required to
escort the reservist to the unit, and confirmation of the escort is the first item documented
on the sponsorship checklist.
Whereas the recruiter is one of the first military members the new reservist
encounters, the unit Full Time Support (FTS) personnel are usually the first members in
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the unit a reservist meets. The unit administrator's responsibilities start before the
member arrives to the unit. He/she should have made prior contact with the soldier,
provided a welcome letter/packet, and coordinated with the First Sergeant for a sponsor.
According to USARC Regulation 140-6, the member's first meeting with the unit
administrator gives the soldier a "feeling of what to expect in the unit" (USARC 140-6,
1997, 7). The unit administrator welcomes the soldier, administratively inprocesses the
soldier, gives the soldier the name and phone number of the sponsor, and answers any
immediate questions the soldier may have.
The sponsorship program is a commander's program. The unit commander has
individual sponsorship requirements, besides having responsibility for the administration
of the unit's program. The commander is responsible for not only personally welcoming
the soldier during the first drill, but also conducting an interview with the soldier that
includes informing him 1 of the mission/organization of the unit and determining the
soldier's goals and expectations of the Reserve. Additionally, the unit commander must
ensure soldiers understand service obligations and participation requirements. The
soldier must sign a certificate (Certificate of Acknowledgment of Service Requirements
for Individuals Enlisting, Re-enlisting, or Transferring to Troop Program Units of the
U.S. Army Reserve), to acknowledge receipt of the orientation (AR 135-91, 1994, 1 1).
Finally, the commander should question the soldier to determine the effectiveness of the
unit sponsorship program.
1 Masculine pronouns in this thesis represent both the masculine and feminine genders.
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The unit's first sergeant/senior noncommissioned officer (NCO) also plays an
important role in the integration of the new soldier. He selects quality soldiers familiar
with the unit to serve as sponsors, and trains the sponsors using the plan in USARC Pam
1 40- 1 . He also conducts a personal interview with the soldier in which he explains
contract requirements, benefit and incentive plans such as the Montgomery GI Bill
(education assistance), and unit standards and training requirements.
First line supervisors also have many responsibilities that impact a new soldier's
first impressions of the unit. These responsibilities include contacting the soldier prior to
the first drill to welcome the soldier to the unit, notifying the soldier of the drill schedule,
and ensuring the soldier has no problems such as a lack of transportation that would
prevent him from attending drill. Additionally, during the first drill, the first line
supervisor's responsibilities include explaining the soldier's role in the section,
introducing the soldier to coworkers, and explaining to the soldier what he should expect
during initial entry training. The supervisor should also ensure the soldier completes
inprocessing.
Although the first line supervisor has a long-term relationship with the soldier, the
sponsor who is usually a peer, influences a soldier's short-term expectations of the unit.
Sponsor responsibilities include contacting the soldier before the first drill to inform the
soldier of what to expect at the first drill, and providing the soldier a home phone number
in case he has any questions. During the first drill the sponsor escorts the soldier
throughout inprocesssing and shows the soldier around the unit area. The sponsor also
introduces the soldier to other coworkers in the unit.
16
The responsibilities of key unit personnel in the sponsorship program are outlined
in USARC Regulation 140-6, and require documentation on the sponsorship checklist.
These responsibilities are specific, and in many cases, overlap or are redundant. The
redundancies designed into the sponsorship program underscore the USARC's
commitment to ensuring new soldiers form good first impressions and are properly
integrated into the unit. A soldier who forms negative first impressions is more likely to
decide not to participate in the Reserve.
D. PARTICIPATION IN THE SELECT RESERVE
The sponsorship program specifically identifies the responsibilities of key unit
individuals regarding the integration ofnew reservists. This section outlines the
responsibilities and participation requirements the new reservist must fulfill to remain in
the select reserve. This section also details enforcement procedures for those reservists
who do not fulfill contract obligations, and describes the consequences of unsatisfactory
participation. Finally, enlisted loss rates, the recruiting and training costs associated with
those losses, and the impact of turnover on total force readiness are presented.
1. Participation Requirements and Attendance Policies
Select Reserve participation requirements and policies are outlined in AR 1 40- 1
.
They include attending all scheduled drills, annual training, and schools unless excused.
In return for his attendance and participation, a reservist earns at least one day's pay and
one retirement point for each unit training assembly he satisfactorily completes (AR 140-
1,1994, 8). A unit training assembly consists of at least four hours of a scheduled training
assembly. Typically, a drill weekend consists of four unit training assemblies.
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The unit commander has the authority to give a reservist an unexcused absence for
failing to be at the scheduled time and place of training or failing to perform duties in a
satisfactory (AR 140-1, 1994, 9). Unexcused absences result in the reservist losing pay
and retirement points for the unexcused period. Unexcused absences are documented,
and placed in the soldier's military personnel records file. The unit commander is
required to send a notice of unexcused absence to a soldier who has accumulated four
unexcused absences within a twelve-month period, and a notice for each unexcused
absence up to and including the ninth absence. A soldier with nine unexcused absences
within a twelve-month period, which began with the date of the first unexcused absence,
is classified as an unsatisfactory participant.
Excused absences include sickness, injury, or other circumstances that prevented
the soldier from attending required training that were beyond the soldier's control. Unit
commanders may require documentation to support an absence, and will request in
writing, that the soldier provide such documentation. This documentation supporting the
absence must be submitted within 15 days of the commander's request, and must include
proof of an incident or medical problem beyond the soldier's control (AR 135-91, 1994,
11). If a soldier fails to provide documentation of the absence, the unit commander may
charge the soldier with an unexcused absence.
Unit commanders may authorize excused soldiers the opportunity to perform
equivalent training in lieu of the missed scheduled training. This allows the soldier to
obtain constructive attendance credit (for pay and retirement points) for scheduled
training the soldier missed. The training session must be of high quality and of the same
duration as the scheduled training missed, and related to the soldier's assigned duties.
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Additionally, the unit commander may authorize rescheduled training, for individuals,
sections, etc., for training the commander believes provides a greater training opportunity
than the scheduled drill.
Although soldiers are expected to train with their assigned units, soldiers can be
attached to other units for training due to an extended absence from the vicinity of the
unit or a special duty requirement (AR 140-1, 1994, 9). The attachment allows the
soldier to obtain constructive attendance credit for pay and retirement points.
The policies and procedures outlined above provide the unit commander
flexibility to accommodate the needs of soldiers. Unit commanders, however, are
required to keep detailed attendance records. Attendance records provide documentation
of monthly attendance to ensure the unit meets the participation requirement of 85% of
the assigned unit strength (AR140-1, 1994, 9). Failure to meet this standard alerts higher
headquarters to potential personnel deployment readiness shortfalls.
2. Unsatisfactory Participation
A soldier is declared an unsatisfactory participant when he incurs nine unexcused
absences from unit training assemblies within a twelve month period, or fails to attend or
complete annual training (AR 135-91, 1994, 12). Failure to attend or complete annual
training (AT) can result in a soldier's prosecution under the Uniform Code of Military
Justice. For unexcused absences, however, the unit commander initiates action against
the soldier by selecting one of two options: 1) If the unit commander determines the
soldier has the potential for useful service, the soldier will be transferred to the IRR; 2) If
the soldier has no potential for useful service, the soldier will be discharged from the
Reserve. In addition, the unit commander has the option to reduce the soldier's rank
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under either option.
3. Costs of Unsatisfactory Participation
Unsatisfactory participation directly impacts limited budget dollars as well as total
force readiness. USARC has determined enlisted loss rates are increasing, as illustrated
in Figure 2. According to USARC Retention Office records, approximately 23% (13,71
1
of 61,042) of the total enlisted losses for fiscal year 1997 are due to unsatisfactory
participation. Increases in losses result in higher recruiting and training costs as vacant
positions must be filled with qualified soldiers. More importantly, assigned strength and
duty MOS qualified shortfalls degrade unit readiness. Currently, the costs associated with
recruiting and training a non-prior service soldier are $19,432 to recruit, and $41,568 to
train for a total of $60,000 per non-prior service soldier ("USAR Command Briefing,"
1 997). In addition, recruiting and retraining prior service soldiers costs $6700 per soldier
(Office of the Chief, Army Reserve, personal communication with CPT L. Frederick,
October 18, 1997). In either case, the costs resulting from nonparticipation quickly
consume a limited budget.
ENLISTED LOSS RATES
FY Enlisted Strength Losses Percent
94 184,315 58,035 31.20%
95 171,218 57,348 32.60%
96 164,263 56,624 34.50%
97 161,371 61,042 37.80%
Figure 2. USARC Enlisted Loss Rates
The issue of force readiness is significant, as many vital support assets are located
in the Reserve. Determining the causes of unsatisfactory participation and implementing
20
programs and procedures to reduce turnover should result in significant budget savings





To better understand the issue of unsatisfactory participation, it is useful to review
relevant theoretical research to establish a framework from which to investigate the
problem. Several different organizational management theories are examined to establish
this framework for analysis. This chapter begins with a discussion of the broadest
theories included in exchange theory research, and then narrows to the theories of
psychological contracts, unmet expectations, and stages of socialization. Finally, an
integrated model is introduced which will shape the design of the study of unsatisfactory
participation.
B. EXCHANGE THEORY
Much research has been devoted to the study of human behavior. Three theories
within the body of research known as exchange theory provide an understanding of the
basic process of exchange that occurs in normal human interactions. The first, social
exchange theory, explores universal human social behavior and introduces the idea that
resources exchanged between individuals. The second, resource exchange, identifies
categories of resources that may or may not be perceived as equal in the exchange
process. The third, equity theory, examines the fairness of exchanges, the dissatisfaction
that results due to perceived injustices in the exchange process, and the methods
individuals employ to reduce dissatisfaction.
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1. Social Exchange Theory
Homans defines elementary social behavior as the "face-to-face contact between
individuals in which each receives a reward from the behavior of the other" (Homans,
1961, 7). Exchange theory is grounded in the fundamentals of economic theory and the
exchanges that occur in the marketplace. Exchange theory considers human behavior as a
function of its returns. An exchange will not take place unless both individuals receive
something they value more than the cost for them to produce. Unlike economic theory,
which primarily involves the exchange of tangible goods such as money, social exchange
encompasses tangible goods, as well as intangible goods such as love. Homans
demonstrates the concept of returns of behavior by noting that "men explain their
behavior by pointing to what it gets them and what it costs them," (Homans, 1961, 13).
For example, an advertising executive might say that he put a lot of time and effort into
developing an advertising campaign, but that it paid off because the firm won a contract
with a major corporation. Social exchange, then, theorizes that society operates on the
basis ofhuman social behavior, which is motivated by gains from the exchange process.
2. Resource Exchange Theory
Whereas social exchange theory identifies that resources are exchanged between
individuals, resource exchange theory examines the particular resources that are
exchanged within the context ofhuman social behavior. Foa and Foa define resource as
"any item, concrete or symbolic, which can become the object of exchange among
people" (Foa & Foa, 1980, 78). Resources encompass money or physical goods, as well
as less tangible items such as a service, or a pat on the back. They further maintain that
"what" resources are exchanged is important to identify, and categorize all resources into
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six classes to further clarify the exchange process. Figure 3 illustrates the configuration















Figure 3. Configuration of the six resource classes plotted on the axes of
concreteness and particularism
The resource classes and their definitions are:
1
.
Love - an expression of affectionate regard, warmth, or comfort.
2. Status - an expression of evaluative judgment which conveys high or low
prestige, regard, or esteem.
3. Information - includes advice, opinions, instruction, or enlightenment, but
excludes those behaviors which could be classified as love or status.
4. Money - any coin, currency, or token which has some standard unit of
exchange value.
5. Goods - tangible products, objects, or materials.
6. Services - activities on the body or belongings of a person who often constitute
labor for another (Foa & Foa, 1980, 80).
Each of the resource classes are aligned on the axes of concreteness and
particularism. The more concrete a resource, the more the resource represents physical
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goods or physical acts. The less concrete a resource is, the more symbolic, or intangible
the resource is. For example, the model illustrates that goods are more concrete than
status on the concrete continuum. On the particularism axis, the more particular a
resource, the more one values the other individual exchanging that resource. Using
money and love to illustrate this concept, it may not matter with whom we exchange
money—perhaps a perfect stranger, but it does matter with whom we exchange love. The
resources in the model are arranged so that resources located next to each other are more
closely related. Additionally, although the model depicts specific points for each
resource, the resources may overlap if more than one resource is exchanged during any
interaction.
Foa & Foa tested several hypotheses to validate the model. First, although they
found that each resource can be exchanged alone, it is more likely that several resources
are exchanged during human interaction. Second, they determined that resources located
more closely on the model are more likely to be exchanged than resources that are located
further from each other on the model. Foa & Foa also determined that individuals prefer
the exchange of related resources, or resources located more closely on the model. This
idea of reciprocity is illustrated by a situation in which individual "A" volunteers to drive
individual "B" to the airport because "B" gave "A" a ride to the airport two weeks before.
"A" is attempting to ensure an even exchange of resources, and reciprocates with the
same resource—a ride to the airport. If, however, "A" only gives "B" a handshake for the
ride to the airport, "B" may be dissatisfied with the exchange. The second part of this
example illustrates that if resources from classes located further from each other on the
model are exchanged, it is likely that one or both individuals will be dissatisfied.
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Exchanges during human interactions occur continuously. Individuals exchange
resources to gain a resource they value relative to the cost of the resource they are
offering in exchange. Foa & Foa classified resources into categories, and theorized that
all resources are not equal. Exchanges that are unequal may result in tension and
dissatisfaction in the exchange process.
3. Equity Theory
The issue of unequal exchange is addressed in equity theory. The discussion of
equity theory addresses a third party in the exchange to illustrate a comparison situation
between individuals in an organizational setting.
Adams defines equity as a balance, or equality, between the ratio of an
individual's inputs and outputs as compared to someone with similar inputs in a similar
situation (Adams, 1965, 280). Inputs are an individual's perceived
contributions/investment in an exchange. Examples of inputs include an individual's
education, experience, intelligence, etc. Outputs are the rewards an individual receives
from an exchange. Examples of outputs include pay, promotion, responsibility, etc. The
ratio of inputs and outputs, and equity can be graphically portrayed as follows:
Outputs of "A " (rewards) = Outputs of "B "(rewards)
Inputs of "A "(contributions) Inputs of "B " (contributions)
Adams states that regardless of the parties involved in the exchange process, each
has his own expectations of what constitutes a fair exchange (Adams, 1965, 276).
Additionally, individuals strive to achieve equity and fairness in the exchange process.
Inequity results when "A" perceives that "B" has a greater output-input ratio. For
instance, "B" might get a pay raise that "A" does not receive. If "A" perceives that WB"
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has the same inputs, but "B" received the raise, "A" would judge the situation as unfair.
This perceived inequity results in "A" feeling tension, and being dissatisfied. In response,
"A" will seek to achieve equity, or to reduce inequity in an attempt to reduce tension and
dissatisfaction (Adams, 1965, 283).
Adams further identifies five methods "A" may employ to remedy the perceived
inequity. The three specific options that "A" can use to correct the inequity that are
relative to this study are changing the inputs, changing the outputs, or leaving the
situation.
If "A" perceives that the major cause of inequity is due to a difference between his
inputs and "B's" inputs, "A" may change simply his inputs. For example, "A" may either
increase or decrease his work productivity, depending on which option will minimize his
contributions and maximize his rewards. "A," however, must be able to change his
inputs. For instance, "A" can alter his productivity, but may not be able to change his
education level, except over time.
Instead of changing inputs, "A" might attempt to change his outputs (rewards).
For example, "A" may make an appointment with his boss to ask for a raise. It may
prove difficult, however, to change outputs. Whereas "A" may have some control over
changing his inputs, "A" may have little control over changing his outputs.
Finally, if"A" is unsuccessful in regaining equity, "A" may decide to leave the
situation. This method, according to Adams, is a "radical means of coping with
inequity," and is more likely employed when the differences of perceived inequity are
greatest and other means to reduce inequity are unsuccessful (Adams, 1965, 292). In
response to the inequity, "A's" absenteeism from work may increase, he may ask for a
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transfer, or, as a last resort, he may quit his job.
C. INTEGRATED CONCEPTUAL MODEL
Exchange and equity theory research provides the general framework for the
introduction and development of an integrated model. The model integrates
psychological contracts and met expectation theory, realistic job preview research, and
stages of socialization into a specific framework which will be used to understand the
process of turnover in the Army Reserve.
1. Psychological Contracts and Met Expectation Theory
Just as an individual engaged in an exchange process has preconceived
expectations of a fair exchange, a newcomer has expectations of fair exchange when
joining an organization. These expectations can be thought of as a psychological contract
between the newcomer and the organization. The psychological contract is continuously
revised over time as a newcomer's expectations approach reality. When a newcomer
and/or an organization cannot resolve unmet expectations, the newcomer may "break" the
contract and leave the organization. Understanding the role of the psychological contract,
and the results of unmet expectations as they apply to the joining process, can help
managers prevent turnover.
Kotter defines the psychological contract as "an implicit contract between an
individual and his organization which specifies what each expects to give and receive
from each other in their relationship," (Kotter, 1973, 92). The newcomer may expect to
receive a certain salary, advancement opportunities, challenging work, etc. In return, he
expects to give his time, technical skills, commitment, etc. Rousseau further develops the
concept and defines the psychological contract as an "individual's beliefs in a reciprocal
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obligation between the individual and the organization," and that organization only
provides the context for the creation of the contract (Rousseau, 1989, 121). The
psychological contract is based completely on the newcomer's expectations about an
organization's obligations, and if not discussed, may be unknown to the organization.
Factors that influence the formation of psychological contracts may be explicit or
implied (Rousseau, 1989, 124). For example, an organization may explicitly promise a
certain salary, and the newcomer will expect to receive the salary promised. Similarly an
organization may be known for the excellent pay provided it's employees. Although just
implied, the newcomer may expect to be paid well for his contributions.
Problems occur when a newcomer's expectations of the organization are
unrealistic. To the newcomer, unmet expectations equate to the failure of the
organization to fulfill its obligations, and are a violation of the psychological contract. In
their concept of met expectation theory, Porter and Steers hypothesized that if a
newcomer encounters more unmet expectations than met expectations, the newcomer will
become dissatisfied (Porter & Steers, 1968). Unlike the dissatisfaction resulting from
unfair exchanges identified in equity theory, a violation of the psychological contract is a
violation of trust a newcomer perceived to have been established with the organization
(Rousseau, 1989, 127). The degree of the dissatisfaction resulting from unmet
expectations and broken trust is likely to result in the newcomer leaving the organization.
Research by Wanous, Poland, Premack, and Davis confirms that met expectations
positively correlate with job satisfaction and turnover (Wanous et. al, 1992, 288).
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2. Realistic Job Previews
The realistic job preview is one method that is used to bring a newcomer's
expectations into congruence with organizational reality. The realistic job preview is an
organizational strategy used to increase the amount and accuracy of information a
newcomer receives about an organization to encourage him to develop more realistic
expectations (Wanous, 1977, 601). Traditional job previews, in contrast, portray the
organization as favorably as possible to attract the most qualified applicants. Recruiting
literature, for example, may depict the organization as an exciting place to work. These
traditional job previews can foster the development of unrealistic expectations and may
result in unmet expectations, a violation of the psychological contract, and turnover.
Realistic job previews give applicants a "vaccination" to deflate newcomer expectations
and provide a "small dose of organizational reality" (Jablin, 1987, 688). Providing a
more realistic preview of the job and the organization may increase the number of met
expectations, which may translate into increased job satisfaction.
3. Stages of Socialization
The previous two sections address theories and research that relate to joining an
organization. Joining an organization, however, entails a developmental process which
will now be discussed.
Jablin proposes three stages of socialization—entry, assimilation, and exit. These
stages are characterized by the communication processes that occur in each phase of
development (Jablin, 1987, 679). In the entry stage, newcomers initially gather
information about a job and an organization through sources such as family, friends, and
the media. This process, defined by Jablin as vocational organizational communications
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socialization (VOCS), may provide the foundation for a newcomer's formation of first
impressions and expectations about an organization. During the anticipatory socialization
phase, newcomers continue to acquire information from organizational recruiters, other
applicants, current employees, etc. These sources may or may not provide an accurate job
preview for the newcomer, and may result in a newcomer developing distorted
expectations. These distorted expectations may ultimately make the assimilation process
more difficult for the newcomer (Jablin, 1987, 693).
Organizational assimilation, the second stage of socialization, is divided into the
phases of encounter and metamorphosis. In the encounter phase, the newcomer learns his
role, and organizational norms and expectations from his supervisor and coworkers. It is
in this phase that the newcomer may experience surprise (Louis, 1980), or unmet
expectations, which may prove difficult for a newcomer with inflated expectations
(Jablin, 1987, 695). The metamorphosis phase of the assimilation stage marks the
newcomer's alignment of expectations to those of the organization. In this phase the
newcomer desires to be identified with the organization, and has internalized
organizational values and behaviors. Whereas the newcomer only received information
in previous phases, the newcomer now provides input and feedback to supervisors and
coworkers in the organization.
Jablin identifies his final stage of socialization as the exit from the organization.
Reasons individuals leave organizations may include personal issues, issues which may
relate to some aspect of the organization, or both. He notes, however, that research in this
area is necessary in order to recognize and remedy dissatisfaction before it results in
turnover (Jablin, 1987, 724).
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4. Model
Combining the concepts of the stages of socialization and the psychological
contract results in an integrated, conceptual model illustrated in Figure 4. Jablin only
identifies three stages of socialization, but discusses other phases that fall under the
umbrella of each stage. The integrated model incorporates Jablin's concepts of
socialization, but reorganizes the organizational context of the model into four distinct
phases. Additionally, unlike Jablin's model, the integrated model characterizes
organizational exit as an outcome resulting from dissatisfaction, rather than a stage of
socialization. As applied to the context of the Reserve, this change identifies that the
reservist can exit during any stage of socialization. This integrated model will be applied
to the context of the Army Reserve, and will be used to study turnover and the problem of
nonparticipation.
Stages of Psychological Contracts and
Socialization to the Army Reserve
Contract Contract Contract Contract














































Figure 4. Integrated model as adapted from Jablin and Barrios-Choplin
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The integrated model consists of four stages, which include anticipatory
socialization, encounter, metamorphosis, and assimilation. Each stage incorporates a
phase of psychological contract development and sources of information which contribute
to the formation of newcomer expectations. In the model, the newcomer to the Army
Reserve may exit in any stage of the socialization process, and may also re-enter the
process.
The first stage is anticipatory socialization. In this stage the individual forms his
initial expectations through interactions with recruiters, other applicants, and possibly
peers who are members of the Reserve. After an individual is determined to be eligible to
join the Reserve, a recruiter provides the individual information about the military, the
Reserve, and the jobs available. Individuals whose initial expectations are not met (a
particular job is not available, for example) simply do not join, or may decide to join at a
later date. Those individuals who perceive the information from the recruiter to be
positive (meeting initial expectations formed through Jablin's VOCS, receiving a
realistic job preview, etc.) decide to join the Reserve. The recruiter may have told the
recruit that he could have a particular job, or the recruit may have only perceived that the
recruiter promised him a particular job. Regardless, the recruit creates a psychological
contract of expectations based on the perceived agreements with the recruiter. Between
the time the recruit joins and the time he reports to the unit, he continues to seek and
process information which contributes to his expectations and psychological contract.
The encounter stage occurs during the recruit's first training weekend. In the
encounter stage, the recruit reports to his assigned unit. He begins to evaluate the
psychological contract based on interactions with leaders and coworkers, and policies,
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standards, training, etc. In this stage, the new reservist may experience surprise (unmet
expectations) if reality is not correctly anticipated. As Jablin and Wanous noted, the
more inflated the expectations, the more difficult this stage will be for the new reservist.
If the new reservist cannot adjust his expectations to the realities of the unit, he may feel
his psychological contract has been violated, experience extreme dissatisfaction, and
finally, leave the organization. His dissatisfaction may be manifested through missing
drills and becoming "U'd" out, failing to re-enlist, retiring, etc. Additionally, if his
performance suffers as a result of his dissatisfaction, the Army may take initiatives, such
as a discharge, to separate the new reservist. A feedback loop indicates that the new
reservist, if eligible, may re-enter the process. If the new reservist's psychological
contract is met, or he can adjust his expectations to those of the unit, he moves into the
metamorphosis stage.
In the metamorphosis stage, the new reservist seeks to be accepted as a member of
the unit. This requires contract revision as he adjusts his expectations to those which
reflect the attitudes and behaviors expected from members of the unit. As he further
develops his role in the unit, he forms new expectations. For example, he may perceive
he should receive a reward (a medal) for tasks he has successfully performed over time.
If the revised psychological contract of new expectations is not met, the new reservist
may decide to exit the unit. Again, if eligible, the new reservist may re-enter the process
in the entry and encounter stage. The revision process is cyclic, and the new reservist is
continually updating and evaluating his psychological contract.
The final stage is assimilation. During this stage, the reservist is fully accepted
into the unit. His revised psychological contract has been fulfilled. He has internalized
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the expected behaviors and attitudes of the unit, and the unit has accepted him as a
member. Through the contract revision process, he has been able to adjust his
expectations to match reality. He also experiences job satisfaction, which may be
manifested through good job performance, or his decision to re-enlist.
The integrated conceptual model represents the socialization process as it applies
to the Army Reserve. The model, as well as the theories studied to develop the model,
guides the research of the problem of unsatisfactory participation. The methodology of




This chapter details the design of the study, which is based on the integrated
conceptual model developed from relevant organizational management theories
introduced in the previous chapter. The model is designed specifically to increase
understanding of the process in which a new reservist enters and is assimilated into an
Army Reserve unit. The model will be used to study the circumstances and reasons
which result in reservists becoming unsatisfactory participants. Understanding why
reservists leave the military may enable Army leadership to identify policies and
procedures which may reduce currently unacceptable high turnover rates. The first
section of this chapter will detail the design of the study and the second section will
describe the data analysis tools used to examine the data.
B. DESIGN OF THE STUDY
1. Interview Protocol
Previous research on the subject of turnover and nonparticipation has focused on
archival data, or used large samples for a quantitative approach to the problem. Existing
research revealed that no one has collected large amounts of data from interviews with
unsatisfactory participants. In this study, an interview protocol was used to obtain more
qualitative data from the reservists in the sample. In addition, the interview protocol
consisted of mostly open-ended questions, which allowed for probing and capturing more
detailed answers from the participants. These "grass-roots
1
' interviews of organizational
dropouts may guide policy decisions at all levels.
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2. Measures
The interview protocol was tested for face validity with phone interviews
collected from ten nonparticipants. It was revised and shown to ten company
commanders and ten first sergeants in the Reserve for a further validity check. It was
then revised a second time. The interview protocol employed in the study is in
Appendix A.
Items were selected for inclusion in the interview protocol based on the integrated
model. Part I includes general demographic information about the respondents. The
questions in Part II correspond to the anticipatory socialization stage of the model, and
characterize the reservist's creation of his psychological contract. This section includes
questions such as: "Where did you learn about your unit?" and "How accurate was that
information?". These questions provide data on the sources of information a reservist
used to initially form expectations of the Reserve and the unit before he actually reports
to the unit. Part III corresponds to the encounter stage of the model. The encounter stage
occurs during a reservist's first training weekend, and includes questions such as: "Did
you get an orientation brief?" and "Did they appoint a sponsor to help you?". These
questions provide data on the reservist's first impressions of the unit, the leadership, the
people, etc., and how well the unit begins to integrate the reservist. The data also
provides information on the reservist's first evaluation of his psychological contract. Part
IY corresponds to the metamorphosis stage of the model, and includes questions such as:
"After you joined, did things go as you expected?" and "Did you talk about your
dissatisfaction with anyone in the chain of command?" Data collected from these
questions provides information on the reservist's met and unmet expectations, as well as
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information on whether the reservist formally attempted to improve his situation. Part V
of the interview protocol reveals information on the reservist's exit from the unit, and
includes questions such as: "What was your main reason for stopping attendance?" and
"What, if anything, would get you to rejoin an Army Reserve unit?". These questions
provide data which reveal the reason a dissatisfied reservist exits the unit. Based on the
conceptual model, when a reservist exits the unit, he experiences unmet expectations, and
perceives he cannot revise his contract. The data also provides insight into what policies
and/or procedures the Army Reserve can implement to influence dissatisfied reservists to
rejoin. The assimilation stage of the model is not addressed in this thesis, as only
unsatisfactory participants, who never were assimilated, were interviewed.
3. Sampling Procedure
The sampling frame was a subset of the population of unsatisfactory participants
chosen from a list provided by the USARC. The list contained the names of
approximately 1 120 unsatisfactory participants from the Inactive Ready Reserve database
collected during fiscal year 1996. A table of random numbers was used to generate the
sampling procedure. The first random number selected was seven. The seventh person,
and every seventh person on the list thereafter, was called.
4. Data Collection
Approximately every second reservist called generated a recall. If the call resulted
in a number which was no longer in service, or did not belong to the nonparticipant, the
name was crossed off the list. An average often calls were necessary to generate an
interview. Therefore, approximately 1000 calls were made to obtain 100 interviews.
Once contact was made, the interview was conducted using the interview protocol, and
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lasted an average of 20 minutes.
After obtaining 1 00 interviews, a coding system was developed for each question.
To test the reliability of the coding system, the primary researcher and an independent
coder each coded a subsample, and achieved 91% inter-coder reliability. Using the
coding system, the primary researcher coded each question on the interview protocol.
The code sheet and the code book are in Appendices B and C, respectively.
C. DATA ANALYSIS
After the data were coded, they were entered into Excel. Both Excel and
Minitab, another statistical analysis tool, were selected to perform analysis of the data.
Specific statistics and graphics commands from Minitab and Excel were chosen to
manipulate and display the data. These tests included frequencies and cross tabulations.




Chapter IV detailed the methodology used to collect information from the 100
respondents, as well as the software used to analyze the data. This chapter presents the
results of the data analysis. The integrated model provides the framework with which to
organize the results. The subsections of the chapter include anticipatory socialization,
encounter, metamorphosis, and exit. The subsidiary research questions, also organized
using the integrated model, are addressed in the corresponding stage of the model. It
should be noted that not all of the numbers, which represent responses, will equal 100%
due to missing, or insignificant data.
B. ANTICIPATORY SOCIALIZATION
The anticipatory socialization stage of the model is characterized by the reservist
receiving information from sources which form first impressions and expectations of the
Reserve. Jablin identifies the process by which individuals receive information prior to
making first contact with anyone in an organization as vocational organizational
communication (VOCS). Sources of information which contribute to VOCS include the
media, promotional literature, family, friends, etc. Once the reservist visits a recruiter,
the first contact with individuals associated with the Reserve is made. All of these
sources of information contribute to the creation of his psychological contract, or
expectations of the Reserve. The research questions in this stage explore the sources of
information about the Reserve and the unit, and examine the role the recruiter plays in
socializing the reservist.
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1. What are the sources of information about the Army
Reserve Program, and are they accurate?
As illustrated in Figure 5, 22% of the respondents reported they received
information from in-service recruiters (ISRs), and 4 1% reported they received
information from local recruiters. Additionally, reservists received 20% of their













Figure 5. Sources of information about the Reserve Program
Figure 6 portrays that 47% and 21% reported that their source of information was
accurate and somewhat accurate, while 21% reported their source as inaccurate. One
reservist who reported he received inaccurate information responded, "I was told I would
get an enlistment bonus, but never got it."
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Figure 6. Accuracy of source of information about the Reserve Program
A cross tabulation of the 'sources of information' and the 'accuracy of
information' in Figure 7 revealed that 13 out of 22 (59%) reservists whose source was an
in-service recruiter received accurate information, 4 of the 22 received somewhat accurate
information, and 4 of the 22 received inaccurate information. Most notably, while 19 of
41 (46%), and 7 of 41 (17%) of reservists whose source was a recruiter received accurate
and somewhat accurate information, 13 of 41 (32%) received inaccurate information. Of
the 20% who received information from family and friends, all reported the information
was accurate, or somewhat accurate.





Didn't get much info
Info missing
Total
13 19 2 8 3 2 47
4 13 3 1 21
4 7 2 2 4 2 21
1 2 1 2 6
1 2 1 1 5
22 41 8 10 10 2 6 1 100
Figure 7. Cross tabulation of source and accuracy
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2. What are the sources of information about the Reserve unit, and are
they accurate?
As depicted in Figure 8, the majority of reservists learned about their Reserve unit
from a local recruiter (39%), whereas only 3% learned about their unit from an in-service
recruiter. In contrast to the high number who learned about the Reserve program from a
friend or relative, only 9% learned about their unit from these sources. A significant
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Figure 8. Sources of information about the Reserve unit
Figure 9 illustrates that 41% of reservists reported sources of information about















Figure 9. Accuracy of source about the Reserve unit
A cross tabulation of the 'source of information about a unit' and the 'accuracy of
the source' in Figure 10 illustrates that 20 of 39 (51%) reported that the recruiter gave
them accurate, or somewhat accurate, information as opposed to 6 of 39 (15%) who
reported receiving inaccurate information.





Didn't get much info
Info missing
Total
3 13 4 1 2 7 30
6 3 9
7 1 1 2 11
8 1 4 13
5 27 3 2 37
3 39 8 1 28 3 16 2 100
Figure 10. Cross tabulation of source of information about the unit and the
accuracy of the source
3. What is the role of the recruiter in anticipatory socialization?
Two questions from the interview protocol were used to determine the role of the
recruiter in the anticipatory socialization phase:
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4a. Did the recruiter take you to the unit? .
Of the 77 reservists who were accessed by a recruiter, 61% (47 of 77) were escorted by a
recruiter to their new units, and 38% (29 of 77) were not. One prior service reservist
reported, " I went down to the unit on my own."
4b. Did the recruiter tell you about the unit 's mission?
Only 28 of 77 (36%) reported that the recruiter explained the mission of the unit to them,
while 40 of 77 (52%) reported the recruiter did not.
A cross tabulation of these variables reveals that 31% (24 of 77) of the recruiters
explained the mission to reservists and escorted them to their units, while 29% (22 of 77)
did neither.













47 29 1 23 100
Figure 11. Cross tabulation of the variables 'did the recruiter tell you the mission of
the unit' and 'did the recruiter take you to the unit'
C. ENCOUNTER
The encounter stage of the model begins when the reservist reports to his unit for
the first time, and continues through the first training weekend. If the reservist's
experiences in the unit do not meet his expectations, he may experience surprise (unmet
expectations). During the anticipatory socialization stage, the reservist creates his
psychological contract from his interactions with a recruiter, other applicants, etc. In the
encounter stage, the reservist evaluates his contract against those expectations for the first
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time.
1. How well does the unit begin to integrate the reservist in the
encounter stage?
Response frequencies conducted on specific questions indicate how well the unit
integrated the reservist. Questions on the interview protocol that address integration of
the reservist include:
6. On yourfirst training weekend:
a. Was the unit expecting you?
Of the 100 respondents, 69% of the reservists indicated the unit was expecting them, and
1 8% indicated the unit was not.
b. Didyou get an orientation brief?
Although 60% reported they received an orientation brief, 30% reported they did not
receive one.
c. Did the commander talk to newcomers?
The commander of the unit spoke to 62% of the new reservists, but did not speak to 28%.
d. Did the unit appoint a sponsor to help you?
Sponsors were assigned to 58% of the reservists, however, 32% did not receive one.
d(l). Did the sponsor do a goodjob?
Of the 58 reservists who received sponsors, 52% (30 of 58) reported the sponsor did a
good job inprocessing and assisting them, 16% reported the sponsor did a somewhat
good job, while 22% (13 of 58) reported the sponsor did not do a good job.
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e. Didyou get inprocessed?
Finally, 71% of the reservists were inprocessed within the first two drill weekends they
attended, and only 4% were never fully inprocessed. A small number of reservists (8%)
indicated that although they were inprocessed before they exited the unit, the process took
more than two drill weekends to complete. One reservist who did not receive uniforms
when he was inprocessed reported, "I couldn't go to formations because I didn't have
uniforms."
Cross tabulations of these questions provide more detailed information about the
quality of a unit's integration plan. As depicted in Figure 12, only 50% of the reservists
reported that both the commander talked to them and that they received an orientation
brief, while 1 8% reported that they received neither. Eleven percent of reservists talked
to the commander, but did not receive an orientation brief, and 9% received an orientation
brief, but did not talk to the commander.
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60 30 2 8 100
Figure 12. Cross tabulation of the variables 'did you receive an orientation brief
and 'did the commander talk to newcomers'
The cross tabulation in Figure 13 illustrates that of the 69 reservists that reported
the unit was expecting them, 45 of those reservists (65%) received a sponsor. Although
the unit expected the arrival of22% of reservists, none were assigned sponsors.
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Dcht get men info
Wonissing
TotaJ
3 13 4 1 2 7 X
6 3 9
7 1 1 2 11
8 1 4 13
5 27 3 2 37
3 39 8 1 28 3 16 2 100
Figure 13. Cross tabulation of the variables 'unit expecting' and 'sponsor'
Finally, of the 58 reservists who received a sponsor, only 50% (29 of 58) thought
the sponsor did a good job, while 22% (13 of 58) thought the sponsor did a poor job. One
reservist who did not receive a sponsor reported that he "didn't feel like part of the unit."
2. What is the nature of met and unmet expectations during the
encounter stage, and do unmet expectations relate to the reasons for exiting during
this stage?
To characterize the nature of met and unmet expectations in a specific stage, cross
tabulations of certain variables were conducted to identify what met and unmet
expectations occurred in each stage. Response frequencies of these questions provided
information about the reservists' met and unmet expectations. The questions from the
interview protocol which address met and unmet expectations and can be identified as
occurring in a particular stage include:
7b(l). Ifsomething was better than you expected, what was better?
As shown in Figure 14, almost half (49%) of the respondents reported that they
experienced something that was better than they expected. Of those 49 reservists, 25
noticed that something was better during the encounter stage. Forty-four percent ( 1 1 of
25) noticed the people in the unit were friendlier than they expected. Less significantly,
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16% (4 of 25) reported that the leadership was better than they expected, and 12% (3 of
25) reported that other benefits and opportunities (promotion, increased responsibility,
etc.) were better. Only one reservist reported that nothing was better than what he
expected. A reservist reported that the officers in his chain of command, "treated me like
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Figure 14. Frequency ofwhat was better than expected' for reservists during the
encounter stage.
c(l) Ifsomething was worse than what you expected, what was worse?
Ninety-two respondents reported that something was worse than they expected. As
illustrated in Figure 15, 42 noticed something was worse than expected during the first
drill. When asked what was worse, 29% (12 of 42) answered leadership and 21% (9 of
42) answered training. As one reservist reported, "all we did was sit there and read the
paper all day—we didn't accomplish anything." Ten percent (4 of 42) reservists
responded that inprocessing was slow/inefficient, and another 10% answered that unit









Figure 15. Frequency of 'what was worse than expected' for reservists during the
encounter stage
9a. What was your main reasonfor stopping?
As illustrated in Figure 16, 1 1 reservists exited during the encounter stage. Of the 1
1
reservists, 36% (4 of 1 1) stopped participating because of the lack of meaningful training.
One reservist reported that the unit did not seem to have a training plan, and as a result,
"time was slow and monotonous at drill." Two exited due to poor leadership
treatment/skills. Another reservist reported that instead of being officially notified of his
promotion by someone in the chain of command, "I found out I was promoted on my LES






















Figure 16. Frequency ofwhy did you stop exit/stop participating* during the
encounter stage
A cross tabulation of the variables 'what was worse than you expected' and 'why
did you stop participating' provides information as to whether unmet expectations relate
to reasons reservists exit during the encounter stage. As illustrated in Figure 17, 2 of the
1 1 reservists who exited during the encounter stage noted that training was worse than
they expected, and then identified training as the reason they exited the unit. Similarly, 1
of the 1 1 reservists noted that leadership was worse than he expected, and also identified
leadership as the reason he exited the unit. Two reservists reported that the atmosphere
was unchallenging, with one exiting because of leadership and the other exiting due to
training.
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Figure 17. Cross tabulation of the variables ' what was worse than you expected'
and 'why did you exit/stop participating'
3. What attempts did reservists who left during the encounter stage make to
remedy dissatisfaction, and what actions did leadership take to resolve problems?
Of the 100 respondents, 1 1 left before the second drill. A cross tabulation of the
variables 'when did you stop' and 'did you talk to the chain of command about your
dissatisfaction' revealed that 64% (7 of 1 1) talked to someone about their dissatisfaction,
while the other 4 reservists did not. Figure 1 8 identifies who in the chain ofcommand the
reservist talked to about his dissatisfaction. Of the 7 reservists who left in the encounter
stage and talked to someone, 3 (43%) spoke to the first sergeant (1SG), followed by 2
(29%) who spoke to either the unit administrator or unit administrative personnel.
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Figure 18. Frequency ofwho did you talk to in the chain of command' for
reservists who exited during the encounter stage
The response frequency of the variable 'what did leadership do' revealed that the
way leadership in the units handled the reservists was almost evenly distributed. For 2 of
the 7 (29%) reservists, leadership took a specific action to rectify the problem. For
example, the commander excused one of the reservist's unexcused absences. For another
2 (29%) reservists, leadership indicated that they would be transferred/discharged without
a penalty. Still another 2 reservists reported that leadership did not do anything to resolve
the dissatisfaction, and 1 reservist reported that leadership ignored his dissatisfaction, or
"gave me the brush-off."
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Figure 19. Frequency ofwhat did the chain of command (COC) do' for reservists
who exited during the encounter stage
D. METAMORPHOSIS
The encounter stage transitions to the metamorphosis stage after the reservist's
first drill, and continues until the reservist is assimilated into the unit. The length of the
metamorphosis stage differs for every reservist, and is a function ofhow well and how
fast the reservist can revise his unmet expectations to conform to the norms and realities
of the unit.
1. What is the nature of met and unmet expectations during the
metamorphosis stage, and do unmet expectations relate to the reasons for exiting
during this stage?
Similar to the organization of the encounter subsection, this section answers the
same questions from the interview protocol in order to characterize met and unmet
expectations in the metamorphosis stage.
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7b(l) Ifsomething was better than you expected, what was better?
Of the 49 reservists who reported something was better than they expected, 13 of the 49
(29%) noticed something was better during the metamorphosis stage. As illustrated in
Figure 20, the reservists in the metamorphosis stage noted the same things that the
reservists in the encounter stage noted. Of the 13 reservists who noticed something was
better during the metamorphosis stage, 2 (15%) reservists noticed the people were
friendlier. One reservist reported that he was surprised by the great "espirit de corps" in
his new unit. Two reservists noticed that the leadership was better, 2 reservists noticed






































Figure 20. Frequency of 'what was better than expected' for reservists during the
metamorphosis stage
7c(l) Ifsomething was worse than you expected, what was worse?
Of the 92 respondents that noticed something was worse than they expected, 34 reservists
noticed something was worse than expected during the metamorphosis stage. As shown
in Figure 21, 9 of the 34 (26%) reservists noticed the training was worse, 6 (18%) noticed
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the administrative processing in the unit was worse, and 5 (15%) noticed the leadership
was worse. One reservist reported that he felt he was "just a number on a strength chart,"















Figure 21. Frequency of 'what was worse than expected' for reservists during the
metamorphosis stage
9a. What was your main reasonfor stopping?
As depicted in Figure 22, 85 reservists exited during the metamorphosis stage. Of the 85
reservists, 15 (18%) stopped participating because of poor training, 13 (15%) stopped
participating due to a conflict with either a job or school, and 13 (15%) stopped
participating due to poor leadership. A reservist reported that there was such a lack of
leadership discipline in his unit that, "everyone called each other by their first names,"





















Figure 22. Frequency of 'why did you exit/stop participating during the
metamorphosis stage
Just as in the encounter section, a cross tabulation of the variables 'what was
worse than you expected' and 'why did you stop participating' provides insight as to
whether unmet expectations relate to reasons reservists exit during the metamorphosis
stage. Although 85 reservists exited during the metamorphosis stage, Figure 23 only
illustrates the most relevant information from the cross tabulation. As depicted in the
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Figure 23. Cross tabulation ofwhat was worse than expected' and 'why did you
stop participating' for the metamorphosis stage
2. What attempts did reservists who left during the metamorphosis stage
make to remedy dissatisfaction, and what actions did leadership take to resolve
problems?
As discussed, 85 of the respondents left during the metamorphosis stage. A cross
tabulation of the variables 'when did you stop' and 'did you talk to the chain of command
about your dissatisfaction' revealed that 59 (69%) reservists talked to someone in the
chain of command about their dissatisfaction, and 24 reservists did not. One soldier who
talked to the first sergeant about his dissatisfaction said "he told me he'd talk to someone
and get back to me—but he never did." Figure 24 identifies who in the chain of
command the reservists' talked to about their dissatisfaction. Of the 59 reservists who
spoke to someone, 13 (22%) spoke to their platoon sergeant. One reservist who talked to
his platoon sergeant, however, noted that "he agreed with me, but I don't think it went
above him." Eleven (19%) reservists spoke to the first sergeant (1SG), and 10 (17%)
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spoke to the commander.
Response
Figure 24. Frequency ofwho did you talk to' for reservists who exited during the
metamorphosis stage
A frequency test of the variable 'what did leadership do' in Figure 25 revealed the
manner in which leadership handled the reservists who left the unit. Of the 59 reservists
who spoke to someone, 15 (25%) reported that the chain ofcommand did nothing, while
12 (20%) reported that the chain ofcommand said they would take a specific action to
remedy the dissatisfaction. Seven reservists reported that the chain of command told
them there was nothing they could do, and 4 reservists reported that the chain of
command ignored them, or gave them the "brush-off."
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Response
Figure 25. Frequency of 'what did the chain of command do' for reservists who
exited during the metamorphosis stage
E. EXIT
When a reservist decides to stop participating in the unit, he has made a decision
to exit the select reserve system. Exiting is not a stage in the model, but is an outcome
that usually results from dissatisfaction, and can occur in any stage of the model. This
section provides information as to what actions the unit usually takes after a reservist
exits the unit.
1. After the reservist exited the unit, did anyone personally contact him?
Answers to the following questions from the interview protocol will provide
information to answer this question.
1 la. After you stopped attending, did anyone personally try to get you to
return?
A frequency test for this question showed that 41% of the reservists reported that
someone did try to get them to return to the unit. Fifty-nine percent, however, reported
that no one attempted to get them to return. A reservist who was not personally contacted
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reported that the chain of command, "didn't even know I wasn't going—I guess they
didn't even care." Another reservist who was only sent form letters advised leadership to
"find out what the problem is and help the soldier resolve it—a letter just pisses the
soldier off."
lib. Who tried to getyou to return ?
Figure 26 illustrates that of the 41 reservists that reported someone did try to get them to
return, 10 of the 41 (24%), reported that their platoon sergeant was the one who contacted
them. Similarly, 8 of the 41 (20%) respondents noted that another sergeant in the chain
of command contacted them. In contrast, only 4 of the 41 (10%) reported that the
commander contacted them, and only 1 of the 41 (2%) reported that another officer in
their chain ofcommand contacted them. Additionally, only 1 of the 41 (2%) reported
contact by the unit retention sergeant.
Response
Figure 26. Frequency of 'who personally contacted you' after the reservist exited
the unit.
1 lc. What did the person that contactedyou say?
As illustrated in Figure 27, of the 41 reservists who were contacted by someone in their
unit, 11 of the 41 (27%) noted that the person that contacted them inquired about their
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situation and the reasons they had missed drill. Twenty percent (8 of 41), however,
reported that the individual only quoted the rules and regulations governing missed drills.
In another 10 cases (24%), the contacting person either asked the reservist, or tried to
convince them, to come back and participate in the unit.
Response
Figure 27. Frequency ofwhat did the chain of command say' after contacting the
reservist after he had left the unit
A cross tabulation of the variables 'who did you talk to' and 'what did they say' in
Figure 28 provides more detailed information. Ironically, the individuals in the chain of
command who have the authority to order a reservist to return to the unit (commander and
first sergeant) did not do so. Generally, the lower the person was in the chain of
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Figure 28. Cross tabulation of the variables 'who contacted you' and 'what did they
say' for reservists who exited the unit
2. What would influence a soldier to rejoin a Reserve Unit, and is it related
to the reason he exited?
The questions on the interview protocol that address this issue include:
13b. What, ifanything, would getyou to rejoin the Reserve?
Although 100 reservists responded, only the significant responses are depicted in Figure
29. Of the 100 respondents, 18 reported nothing would get them to rejoin. Another 8
reservists did not know, or were not sure what would get them to rejoin. Twelve
reservists reported that they would rejoin if they could get a new job or a new MOS, and
7 reported they would rejoin if they could find a unit closer to home. Only 6 reservists
reported they would rejoin if the pay increased. A reservist who would join if his pay
increased expressed that he would work all week in his civilian job, and then "go to the
Reserves for pocket change."
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Response
Figure 29. Frequency ofwhat would it take to get you to rejoin the Reserve'
A cross tabulation of the variables 'what would it take to get you to rejoin' and
'why did you stop participating' provides information about whether 'what would
influence a reservist to rejoin' is related to 'why he exited'. Figure 30 depicts the relevant
information from the respondents. Of the 100 respondents, 74 named something that
would get them to rejoin. As illustrated by the bold, italicized numbers in Figure 30, for
20% (15 of 74) of the reservists, the reason they exited the unit is directly related to the
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Figure 30. Cross tabulation of the variables 'why did you stop participating' and
'what would it take to get you to rejoin the Reserve'
3. What recommendations do nonparticipants have for Army Reserve
leadership to reduce nonparticipation?
Figure 31, which only depicts significant responses, illustrates that of the 100
respondents, 22 reservists recommended increasing the quality of training in the unit.
One reservist wondered, "what happens when the unit gets called to war and we haven't
been training?" Seventeen reservists recommended increasing leadership's interest in and
care of reservists. One reservist made a suggestion aimed at improving both leadership
and training when he suggested that leadership "make soldiers feel like part of a team,
and feel like they're really accomplishing something." Sixteen reservists recommended
that the communications channels in the unit be improved. Additionally, the response
frequencies for the question 'did the quality of communications influence your leaving'
resulted in 75% of reservists reporting that communications did influence, or somewhat
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influence their decision to leave. Finally, 7 reservists recommended that new reservists
should be informed of expectations before they report to the unit, and 4 more reservists
recommended the unit do a better job of integrating new reservists into the unit. One














































































Figure 31. Frequency ofwhat suggestion do you have to keep reservists
participating in drills with their units'
The data presented in this chapter will be discussed in the next chapter.
Specifically, the data presented for each subsidiary research question will be analyzed and




VI. DISCUSSION, CONLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. INTRODUCTION
Chapter V displayed the results of the data collected from the telephonic
interviews. First, this chapter will provide answers to the primary and subsidiary research
questions posed in Chapter I. Second, this chapter will offer recommendations to reduce
the problem of nonparticipation in the Select Reserve. Finally, areas for future research
will be discussed.
B. DISCUSSION
The discussion includes implications and answers to the subsidiary research
questions, and finally, the answer to the primary research question. The research
questions are organized according to the integrated conceptual model presented in
Chapter HI. As mentioned previously, the reservists included in the sample are
unsatisfactory participants who have failed to fulfill Reserve contract obligations. These
reservists may have attribution biases which attribute blame for their behavior to the
institution or to others, rather than to themselves. Additionally, it should be recognized
that some unsatisfactory participants may be poor performers, which may explain the low
percentages of unit contact after the reservist exits the unit.
1. Subsidiary Research Questions
Anticipatory Socialization
a. What are the sources ofinformation about the Army Reserve program,
and are they accurate?
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The primary sources of information about the Army Reserve program are local
recruiters and in-service recruiters. More than half of the reservists whose source was an
in-service recruiter received accurate information, and less than half of the reservists
whose source was a local recruiter received accurate information. Part of this difference
may be attributed to the fact that in-service recruiters access prior service soldiers,
whereas most local recruiters access the majority of non-prior service soldiers. Prior
service soldiers have military experience, and thus may not need as much information
about the Reserve in order to form realistic expectations. In addition, the local recruiter is
rewarded for accessing reservists, and may portray the Reserve more positively than
reality. The resulting overly optimistic view may result in potential recruits developing
unrealistic expectations of the Reserve.
b. What are the sources ofinformation about the Reserve unit, and are
they accurate?
Over a third of reservists learned about their units from local recruiters. Although
only a few reservists learned about their units from in-service recruiters, all reported the
information was accurate, or somewhat accurate. As discussed, the accuracy of the in-
service recruiters may result from the military experience of the prior service soldiers they
recruit. In contrast, more than 10% of the reservists who learned about their unit from a
local recruiter reported receiving inaccurate information. Additionally, almost a third of
the reservists reported they received no prior information about their unit from any
source. Recruiters and other accession sources, however, are not required to brief
reservists about their units. Currently, the unit is the reservist's primary source of
information through orientation briefings, etc. The reservist does not receive that
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information until he reports to the unit for the first time. The reservist has no opportunity
to form realistic expectations of his unit, and may develop unrealistic expectations based
on the generally optimistic information initially presented to persuade him to join the
Reserve.
c. What is the role ofthe local recruiter in anticipatory socialization?
The role of the local recruiter in anticipatory socialization entails facilitating the
new reservist's encounter with his new unit through escorting the reservist to the unit for
his first training weekend. Although the recruiter is not required to brief the reservist on
the mission of the unit, the recruiter is required to escort the new reservist to his unit in
accordance with the sponsorship program outlined in USARC Regulation 140-6. Over
three-quarters of the respondents were accessed by a local recruiter, but only a little more
than half were escorted by a local recruiter to their new unit. This figure is not surprising,
as the recruiter could theoretically have to escort several reservists to different units on
the same day. Escorting the reservist, however, demonstrates to the reservist that the
organization cares about his first impressions of the unit.
Encounter
a. How well does the unit begin to integrate the reservist in the encounter
stage?
Generally, the findings indicate room for improvement in the implementation of
the sponsorship program. Although required by USARC Regulation 140-6, only
approximately one-third of the reservists received an orientation briefing. Additionally,
just over half of the reservists reported they received a sponsor. The assignment of a
sponsor, however, is not a guarantee the sponsor performs his duties adequately. Almost
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a quarter of the reservists reported the sponsor did a poor job. On a positive note,
commanders spoke to almost three-quarters of the newcomers, and almost all of the
reservists were inprocessed within the first two training weekends. The requirements of
the sponsorship program are designed to assimilate the new reservist into the unit as
quickly as possible. When these requirements are not accomplished, the reservist remains
in the encounter stage longer than the first training weekend, which slows the
socialization process. As the length of the socialization time increases, the soldier is
more likely to be dissatisfied, and is more likely to exit because he does not feel included
in the unit.
b. What is the nature ofmet and unmet expectations during the encounter
stage, and do unmet expectations relate to the reasonfor exiting during this stage?
Over half of the reservists experienced surprise (unmet expectations), both better
and worse than expected, during the encounter stage. The significant number of unmet
expectations indicates the reservist did not receive a realistic preview of the unit. This is
not surprising, as most of the reservists received no information about the unit prior to
their arrival.
The majority of reservists noticed the people in the unit were friendlier than they
expected, followed by a much smaller number who noticed the leadership was better than
they expected. Almost a third of the reservists, however, noticed the leadership was
worse than they expected, followed by almost a quarter reporting the training was worse
than expected. Generally, based on the data collected, reservists tended to first judge
human interactions in the unit, rather than unit policies or standards.
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Almost a third of the reservists identified something worse than they expected,
and then exited for the same reason. These findings suggest that the reasons reservists
exit during the encounter stage may be related to unmet expectations that have not been
resolved. Leaders, then, should recognize that the first drill weekend is crucial to the
socialization of the new reservist. If the first drill weekend is not properly managed,
unmet expectations may form the basis for decisions to exit the unit.
c. What attempts did reservists who left during the encounter stage make
to remedy dissatisfaction, and what actions did leadership take?
Almost three-quarters of the reservists who left during the encounter stage talked
to someone about their dissatisfaction. This finding indicates the reservists signaled
someone of their dissatisfaction. These signals allow leadership the opportunity to
identify a dissatisfied reservist and take actions to prevent a reservist from exiting.
Almost half of the reservists spoke to the first sergeant. The first sergeant, then,
has the most opportunity to identify the dissatisfaction and, if possible, take measures to
prevent a soldier from eventually exiting the unit. None of the reservists spoke to the
commander. Lack of involvement may indicate to the reservist that the commander is not
interested enough in the reservist's activities to schedule time to talk to him.
Almost a third of the soldiers spoke to the unit administrator, or the administrative
sergeant. Ironically, these individuals are not in the formal chain ofcommand. These
individuals should refer the reservist back to his formal chain of command, as they have
no leadership obligation to assist the reservist with problems.
While the reservist is being inprocessed, the platoon sergeant may not spend much
time with the reservist during the encounter stage. The platoon sergeant should
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periodically "check-in" with the reservist to make sure the sponsor is taking care of the
reservist, and that there are no problems. The platoon sergeant should also ensure the
reservist knows the procedures to communicate with the chain of command.
Almost half of the reservists perceived the chain of command ignored them, or did
nothing to resolve their problems. Leadership, then, must take actions to change this
perception and be more receptive to dissatisfied reservists. Leadership needs to
demonstrate they care and will do what they can to resolve reservists' problems.
Finally, none of the reservists spoke to the retention sergeant, whose duties
include the retention of reservists. Leadership may want to redefine the role of the
retention sergeant to help in the identification of reservists at risk of exiting the unit.
Metamorphosis
a. What is the nature ofmet and unmet expectations during the
metamorphosis stage, and do unmet expectations relate to the reasonsfor exiting during
this stage?
Fewer reservists in the metamorphosis stage, as compared to the encounter stage,
noticed something was better or worse than they expected. This finding suggests that
based on the model, some reservists were able to successfully revise some of their unmet
expectations during the metamorphosis stage. As in the encounter stage, reservists
primarily noticed the human interaction processes in the unit, such as the people, the
leadership and the training. In addition, the reservists identified problems that were not
as evident in the encounter stage. Almost 20% noticed that processing was worse than
they expected. Whereas leadership can generally assume the majority of the
dissatisfaction can be attributed to leadership and training issues during the encounter
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stage, more long-term issues, such as policies and procedures, evolve as potential
problems during the metamorphosis stage.
The majority of the reservists left during the metamorphosis stage. Over time,
these reservists could not resolve their dissatisfactions and exited the unit.
Approximately one third of the reservists identified something as worse than they
expected, and exited because of the same unresolved dissatisfaction. Again, leadership
must stress the importance of accepting and integrating the reservist, and must attempt to
identify and resolve problems as early in the socialization process as possible.
b. What attempts did reservists who left during the metamorphosis stage
make to remedy dissatisfaction, and what actions did leadership take to resolve
problems?
Almost three-quarters of the reservists talked to someone in the chain of command
about their dissatisfactions. During the metamorphosis stage, however, the majority of
the reservists talked to their platoon sergeant about their problems. Many still spoke to
the first sergeant, but again, unlike the encounter stage, several spoke to the commander.
The first sergeant consistently remains involved in the problem resolution process and
potentially has the most influence on a reservist's decisions to exit. Now, however, the
platoon sergeant and the commander are significantly involved as well. Both the
commander and the platoon sergeant need to be involved in problem resolution earlier in
the socialization process—during the encounter stage. These findings suggest that the
reservist has developed a better understanding of the communications process in the unit,
and knows how to utilize the chain ofcommand to solve problems. Again, leaders should
ensure reservists understand the communication channels and the chain of command
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structure during the encounter stage.
Over half of the reservists reported the individuals they talked to about their
dissatisfaction did nothing to resolve the problem, or ignored them. Additionally, almost
a third of the reservists did not speak to anyone about their dissatisfaction. This finding
suggests that reservists may have perceived the chain ofcommand as being
unapproachable, or perceived that the chain of command could not, or would not, resolve
the problem. Leaders definitely need to keep the lines of communication open with
reservists in the unit, and perhaps learn and practice counseling skills.
Exit
a. After the reservist exited the unit, did anyone personally contact him?
Almost 60% ofthe reservists were not personally contacted by anyone in the unit.
The majority of reservists who were contacted were contacted by their platoon sergeant.
A reservist who has exited should be contacted by every individual in his chain of
command. Many were contacted by the unit administrator/administrative sergeant, or
another sergeant in the unit, and told the rules governing nonparticipation or ordered to
return to the unit. This finding suggests that reservists are being contacted by sergeants
who are tasked to contact them, rather than someone in their chain of command who
should care that the reservist does not want to participate in the unit.
Although the first sergeant seems to have opportunities in the encounter and
metamorphosis stages to influence the reservist, few reservists were personally contacted
by the first sergeant after they exited the unit. Additionally, few were personally
contacted by the commander. The commander and the first sergeant are missing an
opportunity to influence the reservist to return to the unit. The commander and first
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sergeant are figureheads, and a call from either one demonstrates they care about the
reservist's decision to exit, and want him to return.
b. What would influence a reservist to rejoin a Reserve unit, and is it
related to the reason he exited?
Over 80% of reservists might be influenced to rejoin a Reserve unit. The findings
show major influences include a new job or a new MOS, a unit closer to home, and
increased pay. Additionally, the results indicate that for almost a quarter of the reservists,
the reason they would rejoin the Reserve is directly related to the reason they exited the
unit. For example, some reservists stated they exited because they did not receive the
school/MOS/job they desired, and would rejoin if they were given a military school, or a
new MOS/job. The majority of the unsatisfactory participants have already completed
initial entry training, and are MOS qualified. If the Reserve could accommodate some of
these soldiers, training and recruiting dollars could be saved by keeping the soldier in the
Reserve system. For example, attempting to place a reservist in a unit closer to his home,
if possible, would save cost of recruiting and training another reservist.
c. What recommendations do reservists havefor Army Reserve leadership
to reduce nonparticipation?
Reservists' top three recommendations to reduce nonparticipation include
improving the quality of training, improving the quality of leadership, and improving the
quality of communications in the unit. Poor training is one of the trends which
consistently emerged throughout the interview process. The findings indicate that,
although a reservist may be getting paid for attending drill, he values his time and wants
to learn. Developing an incentive program for good training, and placing a list of training
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"best practices" on a web page, for example, may help leadership benefit from other
unit's training successes.
The second trend which consistently emerged is poor leadership. The results
support that many unsatisfactory participants perceived leadership treated them unfairly,
and did not care about their dissatisfaction. This finding reinforces the third
recommendation—that communications be improved. Improving communications in the
unit may improve reservist's perceptions of the leadership. Managerial communications
modules and counseling modules should be included in leadership training.
2. Primary Research Question
Whatfactors influence reservists to stop participating in Select Reserve
unit drills?
As discussed, many factors influence reservists to stop participating in unit drills.
The findings indicate, however, that the most influential factors are training and
leadership. Reservists identified unmet expectations in training and leadership in the
encounter and metamorphosis stages of socialization, and many exited because of training
and leadership issues. Unit leadership exacerbated these problems through little or
ineffective attempts to rectify the reservist's problems, as well as inadequate efforts to
influence the reservist to return to the unit.
C. CONCLUSIONS
The following conclusions are presented based on the discussion in the previous
section.
1. The local recruiter is the reservist's primary source of information about
the Reserve Program, however, one-third of the information reservists receive from
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local recruiters is inaccurate.
2. One in three reservists received no prior information about their
assigned unit.
3. A recruiter did not escort one in three reservists
to his assigned unit.
4. Although required by the sponsorship program, approximately one in
four reservists did not receive an orientation brief, did not meet with the
commander, and was not assigned a sponsor.
5. Reservists generally noticed the people in the unit were friendlier than
they expected, and the training and leadership were worse than they expected.
6. Poor training was the leading reason one in four reservists exited the
unit.
7. The unit first sergeant is the primary member of the chain of command
the reservist speaks to about his dissatisfaction before exiting the unit.
8. The chain of command failed to resolve problems for one of four
reservists.
9. The chain of command personally contacted only half of the reservist
who had exited the unit.
10. If offered various incentives, 82% of the nonparticipants would rejoin
the Army Reserve.
11. The leading recommendations nonparticipants have to increase




The leading recommendations address the major conclusions in the previous
section. Implementation of these recommendations should significantly reduce the
number of nonparticipants, as well as increase force readiness and reduce costs.
1. Provide new reservists realistic and accurate information during the
accession process.
Providing new reservists accurate information and realistic job previews will
enable them to form realistic expectations of the Reserve, and of the unit. Realistic
information may reduce the number of unmet expectations, which may reduce the
dissatisfaction and prevent the reservist from exiting the unit.
a. Equip accession sources to provide reservists realistic job previews so
new reservists develop realistic expectations. Instead of showing training videos which
depict training that is the exception rather than the norm, produce training tapes that
depict a typical drill weekend for an average Reserve unit. Produce a training video that
follows some new reservists through the inprocessing and integration process, and record
what occurs and their responses.
b. Provide accession sources (in-service recruiters, local recruiters and
MEPS) standardized fact sheets about the Reserve and specific units that can be provided
to the new reservist. Reserve fact sheets may have the mission, wiring diagram,
commander's philosophy and goals, etc. Unit fact sheets may include the mission of the
unit, a wiring diagram, commander's philosophy, planned training highlights for the year,
etc.
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c. Eventually enable all units to have web pages on the Internet so
accession sources can easily provide new reservists current information about the unit.
The accession sources could have a computer terminal and modem with access to the
Internet, and could allow new recruits to view unit homepages, as well as print a
hardcopy of the information. Recognizing all units may not have the capability or
expertise to construct a web page, the Reserve might consider contracting for this service.
2. Have a unit representative escort the new unit member from the accession
source.
Currently, the recruiter is required to escort the new reservist to the unit. The
findings suggest, however, that the reservist is not always escorted to the unit. Often, the
recruiter is unable to escort the new reservists he is responsible for to their units due to
scheduling conflicts. Having a unit representative, possibly the retention sergeant and the
designated unit sponsor, report to the recruiting station and escort the new reservist will
ensure the new member is escorted to the unit. Additionally, the unit should expect, and
be prepared for the new reservist's arrival.
3. Develop a unit arrival schedule for new reservists.
The findings suggest that at times, coordination between the unit and the recruiter
does not occur, and the unit is not expecting the arrival of the new reservist. One
recommendation is to study the feasibility of only accepting newcomers every other
month. A standardized arrival every other month would allow commanders to plan
training around the arrival ofnew reservists, as well as enable them to properly plan and
execute the requirements of the sponsorship program (plan and conduct orientation
briefings and the commander's talk to newcomers, select and train unit sponsors, etc.).
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For example, the recruiter would develop a pick-up schedule for each Reserve unit
which corresponded to the units' drill dates, and a unit representative would report to the
recruiting station at the designated time every other month to meet and escort newcomers
assigned to their unit. With a standardized arrival, the chain of command would be
available and prepared to execute the requirements of the sponsorship program. This
procedure would prevent uncoordinated arrivals and sponsorship program failures, which
occurred when one reservist reported to his unit on a day the unit was conducting an Ml
6
qualification range.
4. Emphasize the importance of the sponsorship program in leadership
training.
Leadership training should include the requirements of the sponsorship program,
and the associated cost and readiness implications of failing to successfully implement
the program. The training may include a general overview of the stages of socialization
and expectation theory, as well as the results of this study. The training may also include
role-playing to demonstrate to leaders the importance of successfully assimilating a new
reservist into the unit.
5. The unit retention sergeant's duties should include the entire scope of the
retention process, and not just re-enlistment duties.
Currently, the retention sergeant is primarily tasked with re-enlistment issues. In
addition to the chain of command's efforts to contact the reservist, the retention sergeant
should have a major role in assisting the commander to identify reservists who are at risk
of exiting the unit. For instance, after a reservist's fifth unexcused absence, the retention
sergeant should contact the reservist and try to determine the reasons the reservist is not
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attending drills. The retention sergeant would then inform the commander about the
reservist's dissatisfaction. If the commander determines the reservist has a problem, such
as transportation, that he cannot resolve, the commander may authorize the reservist to
see a recruiter or the battalion retention sergeant (someone who has access to the database
of available units/positions). The recruiter may be able to find a unit that is closer to the
reservist's home. The commander, however, must first exhaust all local resources to
assist the reservist, and should only refer those reservists who have a legitimate issue,
have a good performance record, and are worth retaining. The unit retention sergeant,
therefore, becomes part of the prevention process, and assists the commander in
identifying and resolving the reservist's problem.
6. Emphasize the importance of communication in leadership training
Managerial communications and counseling modules should be included in
leadership training. The perceptions that leadership was unorganized or uncaring could
be mitigated if the chain ofcommand ensured the channels of communication were
open—up, down, and laterally. Leadership should keep reservists informed to reduce the
stress and frustration associated with not knowing what is going on. Counseling training
would provide leadership the ability to be effective and empathetic listeners, and teach
them skills to demonstrate caring through body language, for example.
7. Publicize and reward unit "best practices."
Recruiting Partnership Councils are scheduled at different levels in the chain of
command of the USAR. These councils could be used as a forum to highlight and reward
unit "best practices," including leadership, training, and sponsorship initiatives. For
example, the units may be awarded extra funds to purchase training teams and modules
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from the Readiness Training Center. Additionally, the "best practices" could be
published on a web page, similar to the way lessons learned are published by the Center
for Army Lessons Learned (CALL).
8. The Army Reserve and the Army National Guard should share database
information about unsatisfactory participants.
An unsatisfactory participant represents a loss of training dollars to the Reserve.
Sharing a database of unsatisfactory participants would allow either the Reserve or the
National Guard to fill shortages with individuals who may have completed initial entry
training, or are MOS qualified. For example, if a reservist does not like the Reserve, and
will not rejoin the Reserve, he may be willing to join the National Guard, as some
reservists indicated during the course of the interview. If the database resulted in a
successful rejoin, perhaps the National Guard could pay the Reserve for the accession of
the Army Reserve unsatisfactory participant, and vice-versa, as an incentive to share
information. The Reserve could potentially recoup some of the money invested in
training an individual. Eventually, this information pool could be expanded to include
other Reserve components.
E. AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
This study focused on the factors which influence a reservist to exit a unit.
Further research is necessary to identify factors which influence a reservist to continue to
participate in a unit. Conducting a similar study of individuals who have decided to
remain in the Reserve will provide information for the assimilation stage of the integrated
model.
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Additionally, further research should be conducted on participation in the National
Guard and other service Reserve components to determine the strengths of their
programs. By studying these programs, the best practices in each organization could be
identified, and may result in increased military force readiness and budget savings.
F. FINAL CONCLUSION
The percentage of enlisted losses in the USAR is increasing. Approximately a
quarter of the total enlisted losses are due to unsatisfactory participation. These losses
equate to lost training dollars and decreased force readiness, as others must be recruited
and trained as replacements. This study has used a methodology which involved talking
to reservists, who have left their units, to discuss the reasons and timing of their decisions
to depart. The study has resulted in recommendations, if implemented, may provide




APPENDIX A. NONPARTICIPATION INTERVIEW PROTOCOL
Army Reserve Nonparticipation Survey
My name is . I'm at a graduate school of management. We've been
asked by the Army Reserve to talk to some reservists who stopped participating to find
out the reasons, and what can be done to reduce nonparticipation. Could you take a few
minutes to talk confidentially to me about your experiences?
BACKGROUND
a. Survey identification number
b. Sex
c. Last Reserve unit
d. MOS in your last Reserve unit?
e. How many other Reserve units have you been a member of?
f. MOS in the other Reserve units
g. Active duty
h. Last active duty unit
i. MOS on active duty
j. Time on active duty





p. Distance from home to last Reserve unit (in minutes)
p(a). Distance from home to last Reserve unit (in miles)
q. Civilian occupation
r. Highest level of education
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PRE-ENTRY
2. a. Where did you learn about the Army Reserve Program?
b. How accurate was that information?
c. What was different than reality?
3. a. Where did you learn about your unit?
b. How accurate was that information?
c. What was different than reality?
4. Did your recruiter:
a. Take you to the unit?
b. Tell you about the unit's mission?
c. Give you the MOS you wanted?
c( 1 ). If not, why not?
d. Tell the unit you were coming?
5. a. Why did you join the Army Reserve?
b. Were your expectations met?
b(l). If not, why not?
ENCOUNTER
On your first training weekend:
a. Was the unit expecting you?
b. Did you get an orientation brief?
c. Did the commander talk to newcomers?
d. Did they appoint a sponsor to help you?
d( 1 ). If so, did the sponsor do a good job?
e. Did you get inprocessed (pay, identification card, uniform)?
METAMORPHOSIS
a. After you joined the unit, did things go as you expected?
b. Was anything better than what you expected?
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b( 1 ). If so, what was better than you expected?
b(2). When did you notice?
c. Was anything worse than what you expected?
c( 1 ). If so, what was better than you expected?
c(2). When did you notice?
8. When did you stop attending drills?
9. a. What was your main reason for stopping attendance at drills?
b(l) Was there a second reason you stopped attending?
b(2) Was there a third reason you stopped attending?
10. a. Did you talk about your dissatisfaction with anyone in the chain of
command?
b. If so, who did you talk to?
c. What did the person you talked to do about your dissatisfaction?
EXIT
11. a. After you stopped attending, did anyone personally try to get you to
return?
b. If so, who?
c. What did the person who contacted you say?
d. Why didn't you return?
12. I'm going to ask you a couple of questions about the quality of communication in
your unit. On a scale of one to five, with one being very dissatisfied, and five being




d. How could communications be improved in the unit?
e. Did the quality of communications influence your leaving?
1 3. a. Do you plan to ever rejoin an Army Reserve unit?
a( 1 ). If you have rejoined, why did you rejoin?
b. What, if anything, would get you to rejoin a unit?
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c. What, if anything, do you miss about your unit?
d. What, if anything, don't you miss about your unit?
14. Finally, if you could offer one suggestion to the Army Reserve leadership to keep
soldiers participating in drills with their units, what would it be?






(N/A or information missing = 9, other = 8)
Description
Survey identification number
lb. Sex: male=l, female=2
lc. Last reserve unit: Combat=l, Cmbt Spt=2, Cmbt Svs Spt=3, other=8
Id. MOS: Combat- 1, Cmbt Spt=2, Cmbt Svs Spt=3, other=8
le. # of reserve units: actual number
If. Previous MOS: Combat=l, Cmbt Spt=2, Cmbt Svs Spt=3, other=8,
N/A=9
lg- Active duty: yes=l,no=2
lh. Last AD unit: Combat=l, Cmbt Spt=2, Cmbt Svs Spt=3, other=8,
N/A=9




Time of active duty: under 1 yr=l, lyr to 1 yr 1 1 mos=2, 2yrs to
2yrs 1 lmos=3, 3 yrs to 3 yrs 1 1 mos=4, 4 yrs and greater=5, N/A=9
Time bet. joining and attending: direct entry=l , delayed entry=2,
split option=3
Current rank: PV1=1, PV2=2, PV3=3, SPC-4, SGT=5, SSG=6,
SFC=7
lm. Marital Status: married=l, single=2
In. Children: none=l, 1 child=2, 2 children=3, 3 children=4, over 3
children=4
lo. Age: actual age
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Distance to unit in miles : less than 10 miles=l, 10-30 miles=2, 31-
40 miles=3, 41-50 miles=4, over 51 miles=5, N/A=9
Distance to units in minutes : less than 15 min=l, 15-30 min=2,






Civilian Occupation: agriculture, forestry, fishing=l,
mining=2, construction=3, manufacturing=4, trans/public utilities=5,
wholesale trade=6, retail trade=7, finance, insurance, real
estate=10, services=l 1, public admin=12, nonclassifiable
establishments=13, unemployed=14, studenr=15, self-employed=16
Education: H.S. or GED=1 , some college/tech -2, Associates=3,
BA=4, MA=5
Learn about Reserve?: in-service recruiter=l, local recruiter=2,
media=3, friend=4, relative=5, don't recall=6, no prior
knowledge=7, 8=other
Info Accurate?: accurate=l, inaccurate=2, somewhat accurate=3
didn't get much info=4, don't recall=5




Learn about unit?: in-service recruiter=l, local recruiter=2,
3=media, 4=civilian friend/relative, 5=military related/friend or
relative, 6=no prior knowledge, 7=unit, 8=other
Info Accurate?: accurate=l, inaccurate=2, somewhat accurate=3,
didn't get much info=4, don't' recall=5, N/A=9
What different than reality?: EMERGE
4a. Recruiter take to unit?: yes=l, no=2, don't recall=4, N/A=9
4b. Recruiter tell mission?: yes=l, no=2, somewhat= 3, don't recall=4
N/A=9
4c. Recruiter give MOS wanted?: yes=l, no=2, somewhat=3, N/A=9
4c(l) If no (4c=2 or 3), why not?: if not, EMERGE





5a. Why join Reserve?: EMERGE
5b. Expectations met?: yes=l, no=2, somewhat=3
5b(l) Ifno(5b=2or3),whynot?: EMERGE
6a. Unit expecting you?: yes=l, no=2, 4=don't recall, 5=don't know
6b. Orientation briefing?: yes=l , no=2, 4=don't recall, 5=don't know
6c.
6d.
Commander talk to newcomers?: yes=l, no=2, 4=don't recall,
5=don't know, 6=someone else did
Sponsor?: yes=l, no=2, 4=don't recall, N/A=9
6d(l) Sponsor do a good job?: yes=l, no=2, 3=somewhat, 4=don't recall
6e.
7a.
Inprocessed?: yes=l (w/in 2 drills), no=2, 3=somewhat (somewhat,
but never returned to complete), 6=partially (delay, but happened)
Things as expected?: yes=l, no=2, somewhat=3




If yes (7b=l or 3), EMERGE
When notice?: pre-entry=l, 1st drill=2, 2nd drill=3, 3rd drill=4,
after IADT=5, during AT=6, after 3rd drill=7




If yes (7c=l or 3), EMERGE
When notice?: pre-entry=l, 1st drill=2, 2nd drill=3, 3rd drill=4,
after IADT=5, more than 3 drills=6, during IADT=7
Stop attendance: before 2nd drill=l, 2-6 drills=2, 7-12 drills=3,




9a Main reason?: EMERGE
9b(l) Other reasons?: First reason - EMERGE
9b(2) Other reasons?: Second reason - EMERGE
10a. Talk to COC?: yes=l, no=2, don't recall=4
10b.
10c.
If yes, who?: cdr=l, other officer=2, lsgr=3, pit sgt =4, sqd ldr=5,
retention NCO=6, UA/admin pers=7, other/friend=8, recruiter=10,
other sgt=l 1
What did COC do?: EMERGE
11a. Anyone try to get you to return? yes=l, no=2, 4=don't recall
lib.
lie.
If yes, who? cdr=l, other officer=2, lsgt=3, pit sgt=4, sqd ldr=5,
retention NCO=6, UA=7, other/friend=8, recruiter=10, other sgr=l 1
What did they say? EMERGE
lid. Why didn't you return?: EMERGE
12a. Quality of commo w/ coworkers: very dissatisfied=l,




Quality of commo w/ sergeants: very dissatisfied=l,
dissatisfied=2, neutral=3, satisfied=4, very satisfied=5, N/A=9
Quality of commo w/ commander: very dissatisfied=l
,
dissatisfied=2, neutral=3, satisfied=4, very satisfied=5, N/A=9
How can improve commo?: EMERGE
12e. Commo influence leaving?: yes=l, no=2, somewhat=3




13a(l) If rejoined (if # 13a.=6), reason?: EMERGE N/A=9
13b. What would get to rejoin (if #13a =1, 2 or 3) ?: EMERGE
13c. What do you miss?: EMERGE




APPENDIX C. CODE BOOK
Code Book for emerge questions from the interview protocol
Questions: 2c, 3c, 5b(l), 7b(l), 7c(l), 9a, 9b(l), 9b(2), 13d
1




2 = conflict job/school
3 = negative- leadership treatment and skills (assignments,
favoritism/politics/caring, respect)
33 = positive- leadership treatment and skills
4 = negative- training; lack of training at unit; no significant duties
44 = positive-meaningful training; significant duties
45 = negative-not given school/MOS/job; not working in MOS
55 = positive-given school/MOS/job
46 = negative- transportation problems/too far
66 = positive- unit close to home
7 = negative- processing slow/improper/incomplete (admin problems/pay/uniforms)
77 = positive- efficient processing
8 = other
9 = NA/no information
10= negative- general dissatisfaction with unit/Reserve/Army/military
20 = positive- general satisfaction with unit/Reserve/Army/military
12 = personal/family problems
13= negative- inclusion in unit (unfriendly, not integrated)
23 = positive- inclusion in unit (welcomed, integrated)
14 = negative- hours/work schedule (did not like)
24 = positive- hours/work schedule (liked)
1
5
= negative- people in unit (enemies)
25 = positive- people in unit (friends)
16 = negative- atmosphere (not challenging, unexciting)
26 = positive- atmosphere (challenging, exciting)
36 = negative- atmosphere (too challenging)
46 = positive- atmosphere (laid back/ low stress)
1
7
= negative- Army/Reserve/unit enforcement standards too low
27 = positive- Army/Reserve/unit enforcement standards fair
37 = negative- Army/Reserve/unit enforcement standards too high
1
8
= negative- equipment (lack of quality/quantity equipment)
28 = positive- equipment (had quality/quantity equipment)
29 = unit deactivated/moved/relocated
30 = member relocated
31 = negative- other benefits (didn't travel enough, etc.)
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41 = positive- other benefits/opportunities (travel, food, promotion, etc.)
50 = negative- communications (poor communications)
60 = positive- communications (good communications)
5
1
= general military duties (did not like details, field, PT, PMCS, getting up in
morning)
52 = negative-individuals in COC (commander, first sergeant, sergeants)
62 = positive- individuals in COC
53 = money problems (bonus, school loan, pay)
54 = recruiter gave inaccurate information
80 = "I do not know what I do not miss"
9 = "Nothing was different than reality"
95 = "Nothing was better than I expected"
96 = "Nothing was worse than I expected"
97 = no second or third reason as to why the reservist left the unit
99 = "I do not miss anything"
Questions: 5a, 13a(l), 13a(2), 13b:
1 = affiliation/affinity for military/Army/Reserve
2 = complete contract obligation/enlistment
3 = money for education
4 = money- salary/pay/bonus
5 = training/experience/learning
6 = influence of family/friends
7 = structured environment (discipline, maturity, challenge)
8 = other
9 = NA/no information
10 = other benefits (promotion opportunities, retirement benefits, etc.)
1 = transportation - unit closer to home
12 = rejoined another service, branch of military reserve
13 = trying to rejoin, would join anyway
14 = flexible work schedule
15 = newjob/newMOS/MOS of choice




18= increase standards/standards like active duty
19= new unit/unit of choice
20 = same rank back/promotion
2 = better training
22 = flexibility/change in policies
23 = improve leadership (communication, treatment, control, etc.)
25 = opportunity to go active duty
80 = "I do not know what would get me to rejoin"
85 = "I am not sure what would get me to rejoin"
93 = "Nothing would get me to rejoin"
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97 = "I miss nothing," or "nothing could get me to rejoin"
Question 4c(l):
1 = desired MOS was not available/not feasible
2 = test scores not high enough
3 = given no choice
4 = received MOS already qualified for (no opportunity for retraining)
5 = told get particular MOS, but didn't
6 = disqualified for desired MOS (colorblind, speeding ticket)
7 = misinformed/mix-up by inducting organization (MEPs, recruiter)
8 = other
9 = NA/no information
80 = "I don't know why I didn't get the MOS I wanted"
Question 10c:
1 = look into it/see if anything could do
2 = take a specific action (excuse, give school/MOS)
3 = nothing could do
4 = transfer/discharge without penalty
5 = things would get better/fixed in future
6 = did not want to listen/brush-off
7 = told me to rectify the situation (take PT test, submit letter of documentation for
absence)
8 = other
9 = NA/no information
10 = told me to rectify situation
90 = "COC said nothing"
Question lie:
1 = stated rules/policies (drill dates, required documentation for absences)
2 = asked me to come back
3 = ordered me to come back
4 = convinced me to come back
5 = inquired about situation (why wasn't at drill, why wasn't reenlisting)
6 = tried to rectify situation (find me a ride, excuse an absence, etc.)
7 = left a message
8 = other
9 = NA/no information
10 = never got back to me/never followed up
94 - "COC did nothing"
99
Question lid:
1 = situation unresolved/wouldn't get resolved
2 = general dissatisfaction (fed up, had it, etc.)
3 = job conflict
4 = personal problems
5 = tried to change units
6 = wasn't going to get job/MOS
7 = no significant duties; waste ofmy time
8 = other
9 = NA/no information
10= could not return (slots filled, already transferred to IRR, etc.)
Question 1 2d:
1 = COC needs to establish information channels (suggestion box, open door policy,
communications training, family support group, formations, etc.)
2 = COC listen/help/take care of reservists
3 = improve general communications (top to bottom, increase phone contact, contact w/
reservist's family members, etc.)
4 = hold COC accountable for reservists/training/schedule/discipline
5 = COC establish a better newcomer program/talk to newcomers more
6 = identify the COC; use the COC; improve communications among COC
7 = COC more accessible/available
8 = other
9 = NA/no information
10= replace leadership (commander, COC)
1 1 = policy change (increase drill time, give reservists more leeway, increase prior
service soldier's in unit)
12= communications does not need improvement
13 = reduce changes in unit (personnel/job changes)
Question 13c:
1
= affiliation with unit/military/Reserve/Army/pride
2 = people, friends
3 = camaraderie/cohesion
4 = job, learning, experience, training
5 = discipline, structured environment
6 = pay




= flexible policies (give one more chance, etc.)
2 = increase leadership care/interest in reservists (acknowledge for a good job, etc.)
3 = increase pay/benefits
4 = better training/training plan
5 = better communications (between leadership and reservists, etc.)
6 = transportation (put in unit closer to home)
7 = flexible work schedule (RST's, etc.)
8 = other
9 = NA/no information
10 = brief on what to expect in unit/opportunities for reservists
1
1
= increase the enforcement standards (like Army, like basic, etc.)
1
2
= integrate reservists into the unit
1
3
= improve accuracy of recruiter information
14 = job (make sure have a job before assign to a unit)
1
5
= increase opportunities for military schools/promotion
2 = decrease standards
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